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Abstract
We apply formal methods to lay and streamline theoretical foundations to reason about Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPSs) and physics-based attacks, i.e., attacks targeting physical devices. We focus on a formal
treatment of both integrity and denial of service attacks to sensors and actuators of CPSs, and on the
timing aspects of these attacks. Our contributions are fourfold. (1) We define a hybrid process calculus to
model both CPSs and physics-based attacks. (2) We formalise a threat model that specifies MITM attacks
that can manipulate sensor readings or control commands in order to drive a CPS into an undesired
state; we group these attacks into classes, and provide the means to assess attack tolerance/vulnerability
with respect to a given class of attacks, based on a proper notion of most powerful physics-based attack.
(3) We formalise how to estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS and investigate possible
quantifications of the success chances of an attack. (4) We illustrate our definitions and results by
formalising a non-trivial running example in Uppaal SMC, the statistical extension of the Uppaal model
checker; we use Uppaal SMC as an automatic tool for carrying out a static security analysis of our
running example in isolation and when exposed to three different physics-based attacks with different
impacts.
1 Introduction
1.1 Context and motivation
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are integrations of networking and distributed computing systems with
physical processes that monitor and control entities in a physical environment, with feedback loops where
physical processes affect computations and vice versa. For example, in real-time control systems, a hierarchy
of sensors, actuators and control components are connected to control stations.
In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of attacks to the security of CPSs, e.g.,
manipulating sensor readings and, in general, influencing physical processes to bring the system into a state
desired by the attacker. Some notorious examples are: (i) the STUXnet worm, which reprogrammed PLCs of
nuclear centrifuges in Iran [35]; (ii) the attack on a sewage treatment facility in Queensland, Australia, which
manipulated the SCADA system to release raw sewage into local rivers and parks [53]; (iii) the BlackEnergy
cyber-attack on the Ukrainian power grid, again compromising the SCADA system [31].
A common aspect of these attacks is that they all compromised safety critical systems, i.e., systems whose
failures may cause catastrophic consequences. Thus, as stated in [24, 25], the concern for consequences at the
∗To appear in ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (TOPS). Accepted November 22, 2019.
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physical level puts CPS security apart from standard information security, and demands for ad hoc solutions
to properly address such novel research challenges.
These ad hoc solutions must explicitly take into consideration a number of specific issues of attacks
tailored for CPSs. One main critical issue is the timing of the attack : the physical state of a system changes
continuously over time and, as the system evolves, some states might be more vulnerable to attacks than
others [33]. For example, an attack launched when the target state variable reaches a local maximum (or
minimum) may have a great impact on the whole system behaviour, whereas the system might be able to
tolerate the same attack if launched when that variable is far from its local maximum or minimum [34].
Furthermore, not only the timing of the attack but also the duration of the attack is an important parameter
to be taken into consideration in order to achieve a successful attack. For example, it may take minutes for a
chemical reactor to rupture [56], hours to heat a tank of water or burn out a motor, and days to destroy
centrifuges [35].
Much progress has been done in the last years in developing formal approaches to aid the safety verification
of CPSs (e.g., [28, 18, 19, 49, 48, 4], to name a few). However, there is still a relatively small number of works
that use formal methods in the context of the security analysis of CPSs (e.g., [11, 10, 60, 50, 46, 1, 8, 58]).
In this respect, to the best of our knowledge, a systematic formal approach to study physics-based attacks,
that is, attacks targeting the physical devices (sensors and actuators) of CPSs, is still to be fully developed.
Our paper moves in this direction by relying on a process calculus approach.
1.2 Background
The dynamic behaviour of the physical plant of a CPS is often represented by means of a discrete-time
state-space model1 consisting of two equations of the form
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + wk
yk = Cxk + ek
where xk ∈ Rn is the current (physical) state, uk ∈ Rm is the input (i.e., the control actions implemented
through actuators) and yk ∈ Rp is the output (i.e., the measurements from the sensors). The uncertainty
wk ∈ Rn and the measurement error ek ∈ Rp represent perturbation and sensor noise, respectively, and A, B,
and C are matrices modelling the dynamics of the physical system. Here, the next state xk+1 depends on
the current state xk and the corresponding control actions uk, at the sampling instant k ∈ N. The state xk
cannot be directly observed: only its measurements yk can be observed.
The physical plant is supported by a communication network through which the sensor measurements and
actuator data are exchanged with controller(s) and supervisor(s) (e.g., IDSs), which are the cyber components
(also called logics) of a CPS.
1.3 Contributions
In this paper, we focus on a formal treatment of both integrity and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to physical
devices (sensors and actuators) of CPSs, paying particular attention to the timing aspects of these attacks.
The overall goal of the paper is to apply formal methodologies to lay theoretical foundations to reason about
and formally detect attacks to physical devices of CPSs. A straightforward utilisation of these methodologies
is for model-checking (as, e.g., in [19]) or monitoring (as, e.g., in [4]) in order to be able to verify security
properties of CPSs either before system deployment or, when static analysis is not feasible, at runtime to
promptly detect undesired behaviours. In other words, we aim at providing an essential stepping stone for
formal and automated analysis techniques for checking the security of CPSs (rather than for providing defence
techniques, i.e., mitigation [45]).
Our contribution is fourfold. The first contribution is the definition of a hybrid process calculus, called
CCPSA, to formally specify both CPSs and physics-based attacks. In CCPSA, CPSs have two components:
1See [62, 63] for a taxonomy of the time-scale models used to represent CPSs.
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Figure 1: MITM attacks to sensor readings and control commands
• a physical component denoting the physical plant (also called environment) of the system, and containing
information on state variables, actuators, sensors, evolution law, etc., and
• a cyber component that governs access to sensors and actuators, and channel-based communication
with other cyber components.
Thus, channels are used for logical interactions between cyber components, whereas sensors and actuators
make possible the interaction between cyber and physical components.
CCPSA adopts a discrete notion of time [27] and it is equipped with a labelled transition semantics (LTS)
that allows us to observe both physical events (system deadlock and violations of safety conditions) and
cyber events (channel communications). Based on our LTS, we define two compositional trace-based system
preorders: a deadlock-sensitive trace preorder, v, and a timed variant, vm..n, for m ∈ N+ and n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞},
which takes into account discrepancies of execution traces within the discrete time interval m..n. Intuitively,
given two CPSs Sys1 and Sys2, we write Sys1 vm..n Sys2 if Sys2 simulates the execution traces of Sys1,
except for the time interval m..n; if n =∞ then the simulation only holds for the first m− 1 time slots.
As a second contribution, we formalise a threat model that specifies man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks
that can manipulate sensor readings or control commands in order to drive a CPS into an undesired state [55].2
Without loss of generality, MITM attacks targeting physical devices (sensors or actuators) can be assimilated
to physical attacks, i.e., those attacks that directly compromise physical devices (e.g., electromagnetic attacks).
As depicted in Figure 1, our attacks may affect directly the sensor measurements or the controller commands:
• Attacks on sensors consist of reading and eventually replacing yk (the sensor measurements) with yak .
• Attacks on actuators consist of reading, dropping and eventually replacing the controller commands uk
with uak, affecting directly the actions the actuators may execute.
We group attacks into classes. A class of attacks takes into account both the potential malicious activities
I on physical devices and the timing parameters m and n of the attack: begin and end of the attack. We
represent a class C as a total function C ∈ [I → P(m..n)]. Intuitively, for ι ∈ I, C(ι) ⊆ m..n denotes the set
of time instants when an attack of class C may tamper with the device ι.
In order to make security assessments on our CPSs, we adopt a well-known approach called Generalized
Non Deducibility on Composition (GNDC) [17]. Thus, in our calculus CCPSA, we say that a CPS Sys tolerates
an attack A if
Sys ‖ A v Sys .
In this case, the presence of the attack A, does not change the (physical and logical) observable behaviour of
the system Sys, and the attack can be considered harmless.
On the other hand, we say that a CPS Sys is vulnerable to an attack A of class C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] if
there is a time interval m′..n′ in which the attack becomes observable (obviously, m′ ≥ m). Formally, we
write:
Sys ‖ A vm′..n′ Sys .
We provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability to attacks of an arbitrary class C.
We define a notion of most powerful physics-based attack of a given class C, Top(C), and prove that if a CPS
2Note that we focus on attackers who have already entered the CPS, and we do not consider how they gained access to
the system, e.g., by attacking an Internet-accessible controller or one of the communication protocols as a Dolev-Yao-style
attacker [16] would do.
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tolerates Top(C) then it tolerates all attacks A of class C (and of any weaker class3). Similarly, if a CPS
is vulnerable to Top(C), in the time interval m′..n′, then no attacks of class C (or weaker) can affect the
system out of that time interval. This is very useful when checking for attack tolerance/vulnerability with
respect to all attacks of a given class C.
As a third contribution, we formalise how to estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS. As
expected, risk assessment in industrial CPSs is a crucial phase preceding any defence strategy implementa-
tion [54]. The objective of this phase is to prioritise among vulnerabilities; this is done based on the likelihood
that vulnerabilities are exploited, and the impact on the system under attack if exploitation occurs. In this
manner, the resources can then be focused on preventing the most critical vulnerabilities [44]. We provide
a metric to estimate the maximum perturbation introduced in the system under attack with respect to its
genuine behaviour, according to its evolution law and the uncertainty of the model. Then, we prove that the
impact of the most powerful attack Top(C) represents an upper bound for the impact of any attack A of
class C (or weaker).
Finally, as a fourth contribution, we formalise a running example in Uppaal SMC [15], the statistical
extension of the Uppaal model checker [5] supporting the analysis of systems expressed as composition of
timed and/or probabilistic automata. Our goal is to test Uppaal SMC as an automatic tool for the static
security analysis of a simple but significant CPS exposed to a number of different physics-based attacks with
different impacts on the system under attack. Here, we wish to remark that while we have kept our running
example simple, it is actually non-trivial and designed to describe a wide number of attacks, as will become
clear below.
This paper extends and supersedes a preliminary conference version that appeared in [40]. All the results
presented in the current paper have been formally proven, although, due to lack of space, proofs of minor state-
ments can be found in the associated technical report [39]. The Uppaal SMC models of our system and the at-
tacks that we have found are available at the repository https://bitbucket.org/AndreiMunteanu/cps_smc/src/.
1.4 Organisation
In Section 2, we give syntax and semantics of CCPSA. In Section 3, we provide our running example and its
formalisation in Uppaal SMC. In Section 4, we first define our threat model for physics-based attacks, then
we use Uppaal SMC to carry out a security analysis of our running example when exposed to three different
attacks, and, finally, we provide sufficient criteria for attack tolerance/vulnerability, based on a proper notion
of most powerful attack. In Section 5, we estimate the impact of attacks on CPSs and prove that the most
powerful attack of a given class has the maximum impact with respect to all attacks of the same class (or of
a weaker one). In Section 6, we draw conclusions and discuss related and future work.
2 The Calculus
In this section, we introduce our Calculus of Cyber-Physical Systems and Attacks, CCPSA, which extends
the Calculus of Cyber-Physical Systems, defined in our companion papers [37, 42], with specific features to
formalise and study attacks to physical devices.
Let us start with some preliminary notation.
2.1 Syntax of CCPSA
Notation 1. We use x, xk for state variables (associated to physical states of systems), c, d for communication
channels, a, ak for actuator devices, and s, sk or sensors devices.
Actuator names are metavariables for actuator devices like valve, light , etc. Similarly, sensor names are
metavariables for sensor devices, e.g., a sensor thermometer that measures a state variable called temperature,
with a given precision.
3Intuitively, attacks of classes weaker than C can do less with respect to attacks of class C.
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Values, ranged over by v, v′, w, are built from basic values, such as Booleans, integers and real numbers;
they also include names.
Given a generic set of names N , we write RN to denote the set of functions assigning a real value to
each name in N . For ξ ∈ RN , n ∈ N and v ∈ R, we write ξ[n 7→ v] to denote the function ψ ∈ RN such that
ψ(m) = ξ(m), for any m 6= n, and ψ(n) = v. Given two generic functions ξ1 and ξ2 with disjoint domains
N1 and N2, respectively, we denote with ξ1 ∪ ξ2 the function such that (ξ1 ∪ ξ2)(n) = ξ1(n), if n ∈ N1, and
(ξ1 ∪ ξ2)(n) = ξ2(n), if n ∈ N2.
In general, a cyber-physical system consists of: (i) a physical component (defining state variables, physical
devices, physical evolution, etc.) and (ii) a cyber (or logical) component that interacts with the physical
devices (sensors and actuators) and communicates with other cyber components of the same or of other CPSs.
Physical components in CCPSA are given by two sub-components: (i) the physical state, which is supposed
to change at runtime, and (ii) the physical environment, which contains static information.4
Definition 1 (Physical state). Let X be a set of state variables, S be a set of sensors, and A be a set of
actuators. A physical state S is a triple 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉, where:
• ξx ∈ RX is the state function,
• ξs ∈ RS is the sensor function,
• ξa ∈ RA is the actuator function.
All functions defining a physical state are total.
The state function ξx returns the current value associated to each variable in X , the sensor function ξs
returns the current value associated to each sensor in S and the actuator function ξa returns the current
value associated to each actuator in A.
Definition 2 (Physical environment). Let X be a set of state variables, S be a set of sensors, and A be a
set of actuators. A physical environment E is a 6-tuple 〈evol ,meas, inv , safe, ξw, ξe〉, where:
• evol : RX × RA × RX → 2RX is the evolution map,
• meas : RX × RS → 2RS is the measurement map,
• inv ∈ 2RX is the invariant set,
• safe ∈ 2RX is the safety set,
• ξw ∈ RX is the uncertainty function,
• ξe ∈ RS is the sensor-error function.
All functions defining a physical environment are total functions.
The evolution map evol models the evolution law of the physical system, where changes made on actuators
may reflect on state variables. Given a state function, an actuator function, and an uncertainty function, the
evolution map evol returns the set of next admissible state functions. Since we assume an uncertainty in our
models, evol does not return a single state function but a set of possible state functions.
The measurement map meas returns the set of next admissible sensor functions based on the current
state function. Since we assume error-prone sensors, meas does not return a single sensor function but a set
of possible sensor functions.
The invariant set inv represents the set of state functions that satisfy the invariant of the system. A
CPS that gets into a physical state with a state function that does not satisfy the invariant is in deadlock.
4Actually, this information is periodically updated (say, every six months) to take into account possible drifts of the system.
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Similarly, the safety set safe represents the set of state functions that satisfy the safety conditions of the
system. Intuitively, if a CPS gets into an unsafe state, then its functionality may get compromised.
The uncertainty function ξw returns the uncertainty (or accuracy) associated to each state variable. Thus,
given a state variable x ∈ X , ξw(x) returns the maximum distance between the real value of x, in an arbitrary
moment in time, and its representation in the model. For ξw, ξ′w ∈ RX , we will write ξw ≤ ξ′w if ξw(x) ≤ ξ′w(x),
for any x ∈ X . The evolution map evol is obviously monotone with respect to uncertainty: if ξw ≤ ξ′w then
evol(ξx, ξa, ξw) ⊆ evol(ξx, ξa, ξ′w).
Finally, the sensor-error function ξe returns the maximum error associated to each sensor in S.
Let us now define formally the cyber component of a CPS in CCPSA. Our (logical) processes build on
Hennessy and Regan’s Timed Process Language TPL [27], basically, CCS enriched with a discrete notion of
time. We extend TPL with two main ingredients:
• two constructs to read values detected at sensors and write values on actuators, respectively;
• special constructs to represent malicious activities on physical devices.
The remaining constructs are the same as those of TPL.
Definition 3 (Processes). Processes are defined as follows:
P,Q ::= nil
∣∣ tick.P ∣∣ P ‖ Q ∣∣ pi.P ∣∣ φ.P ∣∣ bµ.P cQ ∣∣ if (b) {P} else {Q} ∣∣ P\c ∣∣ H〈w˜〉
pi ::= rcv c(x)
∣∣ snd c〈v〉
φ ::= read s(x)
∣∣ write a〈v〉
µ ::= sniff s(x)
∣∣ drop a(x) ∣∣ forge p〈v〉 .
We write nil for the terminated process. The process tick.P sleeps for one time unit and then continues as P .
We write P ‖ Q to denote the parallel composition of concurrent threads P and Q. The process pi.P denotes
channel transmission. The construct φ.P denotes activities on physical devices, i.e., sensor reading and
actuator writing. The process bµ.P cQ denotes MITM malicious activities under timeout targeting physical
devices (sensors and actuators). More precisely, we support sensor sniffing, drop of actuator commands, and
integrity attacks on data coming from sensors and addressed to actuators. Thus, for instance, bdrop a(x).P cQ
drops a command on the actuator a supplied by the controller in the current time slot; otherwise, if there are
no commands on a, it moves to the next time slot and evolves into Q.
The process P\c is the channel restriction operator of CCS. We sometimes write P\{c1, c2, . . . , cn} to
mean P\c1\c2 · · · \cn. The process if (b) {P} else{Q} is the standard conditional, where b is a decidable guard.
In processes of the form tick.Q and bµ.P cQ, the occurrence of Q is said to be time-guarded. The process
H〈w˜〉 denotes (guarded) recursion.
We assume a set of process identifiers ranged over by H,H1, H2. We write H〈w1, . . . , wk〉 to denote a
recursive process H defined via an equation H(x1, . . . , xk) = P , where (i) the tuple x1, . . . , xk contains all
the variables that appear free in P , and (ii) P contains only guarded occurrences of the process identifiers,
such as H itself. We say that recursion is time-guarded if P contains only time-guarded occurrences of the
process identifiers. Unless explicitly stated our recursive processes are always time-guarded.
In the constructs rcv c(x).P , read s(x).P , bsniff s(x).P cQ and bdrop a(x).P cQ the variable x is said to be
bound. This gives rise to the standard notions of free/bound (process) variables and α-conversion. A term is
closed if it does not contain free variables, and we assume to always work with closed processes: the absence
of free variables is preserved at run-time. As further notation, we write T{v/x} for the substitution of all
occurrences of the free variable x in T with the value v.
Everything is in place to provide the definition of cyber-physical systems expressed in CCPSA.
Definition 4 (Cyber-physical system). Fixed a set of state variables X , a set of sensors S, and a set of
actuators A, a cyber-physical system in CCPSA is given by two main components:
• a physical component consisting of
– a physical environment E defined on X , S, and A, and
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– a physical state S recording the current values associated to the state variables in X , the sensors
in S, and the actuators in A;
• a cyber component P that interacts with the sensors in S and the actuators A, and can communicate,
via channels, with other cyber components of the same or of other CPSs.
We write E;SonP to denote the resulting CPS, and use M and N to range over CPSs. Sometimes, when the
physical environment E is clearly identified, we write SonP instead of E;SonP . CPSs of the form SonP are
called environment-free CPSs.
The syntax of our CPSs is slightly too permissive as a process might use sensors and/or actuators that
are not defined in the physical state. To rule out ill-formed CPSs, we use the following definition.
Definition 5 (Well-formedness). Let E = 〈evol ,meas, inv , safe, ξw, ξe〉 be a physical environment, let S =
〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉 be a physical state defined on a set of physical variables X , a set of sensors S, and a set of actuators
A, and let P be a process. The CPS E;SonP is said to be well-formed if: (i) any sensor mentioned in P is
in the domain of the function ξs; (ii) any actuator mentioned in P is in the domain of the function ξa.
In the rest of the paper, we will always work with well-formed CPSs and use the following abbreviations.
Notation 2. We write µ.P for the process defined via the equation Q = bµ.P cQ, where Q does not occur in
P . Further, we write
• bµcQ as an abbreviation for bµ.nilcQ,
• bµ.P c as an abbreviation for bµ.P cnil,
• snd c and rcv c, when channel c is used for pure synchronisation,
• tickk.P as a shorthand for tick . . . tick.P , where the prefix tick appears k ≥ 0 consecutive times.
Finally, let M = E;SonP , we write M ‖ Q for E;Son (P ‖ Q), and M\c for E;Son (P\c).
2.2 Labelled transition semantics
In this subsection, we provide the dynamics of CCPSA in terms of a labelled transition system (LTS) in the
SOS style of Plotkin. First, we give in Table 1 an LTS for logical processes, then in Table 2 we lift transition
rules from processes to environment-free CPSs.
In Table 1, the meta-variable λ ranges over labels in the set {tick, τ, cv, cv, a!v, s?v, Ep!v, Ep?v}. Rules
(Outp), (Inpp) and (Com) serve to model channel communication, on some channel c. Rules (Read) and (Write)
denote sensor reading and actuator writing, respectively. The following three rules model three different
MITM malicious activities: sensor sniffing, dropping of actuator commands, and integrity attacks on data
coming from sensors or addressed to actuators. In particular, rule (EActDrop E) models a DoS attack to the
actuator a, where the update request of the controller is dropped by the attacker and it never reaches the
actuator, whereas rule (ESensIntegr E) models an integrity attack on sensor s, as the controller of s is supplied
with a fake value v forged by the attack. Rule (Par) propagates untimed actions over parallel components.
Rules (Res), (Rec), (Then) and (Else) are standard. The following four rules (TimeNil), (Sleep), (TimeOut) and
(TimePar) model the passage of time. For simplicity, we omit the symmetric counterparts of the rules (Com),
(EActDrop E), (ESensIntegr E), and (Par).
In Table 2, we lift the transition rules from processes to environment-free CPSs of the form SonP for
S = 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉. The transition rules are parametric on a physical environment E. Except for rule (Deadlock),
all rules have a common premise ξx ∈ inv : a system can evolve only if the invariant is satisfied by the
current physical state. Here, actions, ranged over by α, are in the set {τ, cv, cv, tick, deadlock, unsafe}. These
actions denote: internal activities (τ); channel transmission (cv and cv); the passage of time (tick); and
two specific physical events: system deadlock (deadlock) and the violation of the safety conditions (unsafe).
Rules (Out) and (Inp) model transmission and reception, with an external system, on a channel c. Rule
(SensRead) models the reading of the current data detected at a sensor s; here, the presence of a malicious
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Table 1: LTS for processes
(Inpp)
−
rcv c(x).P
cv−−−→ P{v/x}
(Outp)
−
snd c〈v〉.P cv−−−→ P
(Com)
P
cv−−−→ P ′ Q cv−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q τ−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
(Par)
P
λ−−→ P ′ λ 6= tick
P ‖ Q λ−−→ P ′ ‖ Q
(Read)
−
read s(x).P
s?v−−−→ P{v/x}
(Write)
−
write a〈v〉.P a!v−−−→ P
(ESniffE)
−
bsniff s(x).P cQ Es?v−−−−→ P{v/x}
(EDropE)
−
bdrop a(x).P cQ Ea?v−−−−→ P{v/x}
(EForgeE)
p ∈ {s, a}
bforge p〈v〉.P cQ Ep!v−−−−→ P
(EActDropE) P
a!v−−−→ P ′ Q Ea?v−−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q τ−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
(ESensIntegrE) P
Es!v−−−−→ P ′ Q s?v−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q τ−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
(Res)
P
λ−−→ P ′ λ 6∈ {cv, cv}
P\c λ−−→ P ′\c
(Rec)
P{w˜/˜x} λ−−→ Q H(x˜) = P
H〈w˜〉 λ−−→ Q
(Then)
JbK = true P λ−−→ P ′
if (b) {P} else {Q} λ−−→ P ′
(Else)
JbK = false Q λ−−→ Q′
if (b) {P} else {Q} λ−−→ Q′
(TimeNil)
−
nil
tick−−−→ nil
(Sleep)
−
tick.P
tick−−−→ P
(Timeout)
−
bµ.P cQ tick−−−→ Q
(TimePar)
P
tick−−−→ P ′ Q tick−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q tick−−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
action Es!w would prevent the reading of the sensor. We already said that rule (ESensIntegr E) of Table 1
models integrity attacks on a sensor s. However, together with rule (SensRead), it also serves to implicitly
model DoS attacks on a sensor s, as the controller of s cannot read its correct value if the attacker is
currently supplying a fake value for it. Rule (ESensSniffE) allows the attacker to read the confidential value
detected at a sensor s. Rule (ActWrite) models the writing of a value v on an actuator a; here, the presence
of an attack capable of performing a drop action Ea?v prevents the access to the actuator by the controller.
Rule (EActIntegrE) models a MITM integrity attack to an actuator a, as the actuator is provided with a
value forged by the attack. Rule (Tau) lifts non-observable actions from processes to systems. This includes
communications channels and attacks’ accesses to physical devices. A similar lifting occurs in rule (Time) for
timed actions, where next(E;S) returns the set of possible physical states for the next time slot. Formally,
for E = 〈evol ,meas, inv , safe, ξw, ξe〉 and S = 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉, we define:
next(E;S)
def
=
{〈ξ′x, ξ′s, ξ′a〉 : ξ′x ∈ evol(ξx, ξa, ξw) ∧ ξ′s ∈ meas(ξ′x, ξe) ∧ ξ′a = ξa} .
Thus, by an application of rule (Time) a CPS moves to the next physical state, in the next time slot.
Rule (Deadlock) is introduced to signal the violation of the invariant. When the invariant is violated, a
system deadlock occurs and then, in CCPSA, the system emits a special action deadlock, forever. Similarly,
rule (Safety) is introduced to detect the violation of safety conditions. In this case, the system may emit a
special action unsafe and then continue its evolution.
Summarising, in the LTS of Table 2 we define transitions rules of the form SonP α−−→ S′onP ′, parametric
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Table 2: LTS for CPSs SonP parametric on an environment E = 〈evol ,meas, inv , safe, ξw, ξe〉
(Out)
S = 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉 P cv−−−→ P ′ ξx ∈ inv
SonP cv−−−→ SonP ′
(Inp)
S = 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉 P cv−−−→ P ′ ξx ∈ inv
SonP cv−−−→ SonP ′
(SensRead) P
s?v−−−→ P ′ ξs(s) = v P Es!v−−−−→6 ξx ∈ inv
〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉onP τ−−→ 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉onP ′
(ESensSniffE) P
Es?v−−−−→ P ′ ξs(s) = v ξx ∈ inv
〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉onP τ−−→ 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉onP ′
(ActWrite) P
a!v−−−→ P ′ ξ′a = ξa[a 7→ v] P Ea?v−−−−→6 ξx ∈ inv
〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉onP τ−−→ 〈ξx, ξs, ξ′a〉onP ′
(EActIntegrE) P
Ea!v−−−−→ P ′ ξ′a = ξa[a 7→ v] ξx ∈ inv
〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉onP τ−−→ 〈ξx, ξs, ξ′a〉onP ′
(Tau)
P
τ−−→ P ′ ξx ∈ inv
〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉onP τ−−→ 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉onP ′
(Deadlock)
S = 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉 ξx 6∈ inv
SonP deadlock−−−−−−→ SonP
(Time)
P
tick−−−→ P ′ S = 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉 S′ ∈ next(E;S) ξx ∈ inv
SonP tick−−−→ S′onP ′
(Safety)
S = 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉 ξx 6∈ safe ξx ∈ inv
SonP unsafe−−−−−→ SonP
on some physical environment E. As physical environments do not change at runtime, SonP α−−→ S′onP ′
entails E;SonP α−−→ E;S′onP ′, thus providing the LTS for all CPSs in CCPSA.
Remark 1. Note that our operational semantics ensures that malicious actions of the form Es!v (integrity/DoS
attack on sensor s) or Ea?v (DoS attack on actuator a) have a pre-emptive power. These attacks can always
prevent the regular access to a physical device by its controller.
2.3 Behavioural semantics
Having defined the actions that can be performed by a CPS of the form E;SonP , we can easily concatenate
these actions to define the possible execution traces of the system. Formally, given a trace t = α1 . . . αn, we
will write
t−−→ as an abbreviation for α1−−−→ . . . αn−−−→, and we will use the function #tick(t) to get the number
of occurrences of the action tick in t.
The notion of trace allows us to provide a formal definition of system soundness: a CPS is said to be
sound if it never deadlocks and never violates the safety conditions.
Definition 6 (System soundness). Let M be a well-formed CPS. We say that M is sound if whenever
M
t−−→M ′, for some t, the actions deadlock and unsafe never occur in t.
In our security analysis, we will always focus on sound CPSs.
We recall that the observable activities in CCPSA are: time passing, system deadlock, violation of safety
conditions, and channel communication. Having defined a labelled transition semantics, we are ready to
formalise our behavioural semantics, based on execution traces.
We adopt a standard notation for weak transitions: we write =⇒ for ( τ−−→)∗, whereas α==⇒ means
=⇒ α−−→=⇒, and finally αˆ=⇒ denotes =⇒ if α = τ and α=⇒ otherwise. Given a trace t = α1. . .αn, we write
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tˆ
==⇒ as an abbreviation for α̂1===⇒ . . . α̂n===⇒.
Definition 7 (Trace preorder). We write M v N if whenever M t−−→M ′, for some t, there is N ′ such that
N
tˆ
==⇒ N ′.
Remark 2. Unlike other process calculi, in CCPSA our trace preorder is able to observe (physical) deadlock due
to the presence of the rule (Deadlock) and the special action deadlock: whenever M v N then M eventually
deadlocks if and only if N eventually deadlocks (see Lemma 1 in the appendix).
Our trace preorder can be used for compositional reasoning in those contexts that don’t interfere on physical
devices (sensors and actuators) while they may interfere on logical components (via channel communication).
In particular, trace preorder is preserved by parallel composition of physically-disjoint CPSs, by parallel
composition of pure-logical processes, and by channel restriction. Intuitively, two CPSs are physically-disjoint
if they have different plants but they may share logical channels for communication purposes. More precisely,
physically-disjoint CPSs have disjoint state variables and disjoint physical devices (sensors and actuators).
As we consider only well-formed CPSs (Definition 5), this ensures that a CPS cannot physically interfere
with a parallel CPS by acting on its physical devices.
Formally, let Si = 〈ξix, ξis, ξia〉 and Ei = 〈evol i,measi, inv i, safei, ξiw, ξie〉 be physical states and physical
environments, respectively, associated to sets of state variables Xi, sets of sensors Si, and sets of actuators
Ai, for i ∈ {1, 2}. For X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and A1 ∩ A2 = ∅, we define:
• the disjoint union of the physical states S1 and S2, written S1 unionmulti S2, to be the physical state 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉
such that: ξx = ξ1x ∪ ξ2x, ξs = ξ1s ∪ ξ2s , and ξa = ξ1a ∪ ξ2a ;
• the disjoint union of the physical environments E1 and E2, written E1 unionmulti E2, to be the physical
environment 〈evol ,meas, inv , safe, ξw, ξe〉 such that:
1. evol = evol1 ∪ evol2
2. meas = meas1 ∪meas2
3. S1 unionmulti S2 ∈ inv iff S1 ∈ inv1 and S2 ∈ inv2
4. S1 unionmulti S2 ∈ safe iff S1 ∈ safe1 and S2 ∈ safe2
5. ξw = ξ1w ∪ ξ2w
6. ξe = ξ1e ∪ ξ2e .
Definition 8 (Physically-disjoint CPSs). Let Mi = Ei;SionPi, for i ∈ {1, 2}. We say that M1 and M2 are
physically-disjoint if S1 and S2 have disjoint sets of state variables, sensors and actuators. In this case, we
write M1 unionmultiM2 to denote the CPS defined as (E1 unionmulti E2); (S1 unionmulti S2)on (P1 ‖ P2).
A pure-logical process is a process that may interfere on communication channels but it never interferes
on physical devices as it never accesses sensors and/or actuators. Basically, a pure-logical process is a TPL
process [27]. Thus, in a systemM ‖ Q, whereM is an arbitrary CPS, a pure-logical process Q cannot interfere
with the physical evolution of M . A process Q can, however, definitely interact with M via communication
channels, and hence affect its observable behaviour.
Definition 9 (Pure-logical processes). A process P is called pure-logical if it never acts on sensors and/or
actuators.
Now, we can finally state the compositionality of our trace preorder v (the proof can be found in the
appendix).
Theorem 1 (Compositionality of v). Let M and N be two arbitrary CPSs in CCPSA.
1. M v N implies M unionmultiO v N unionmultiO, for any physically-disjoint CPS O;
10
2. M v N implies M ‖ P v N ‖ P , for any pure-logical process P ;
3. M v N implies M\c v N\c, for any channel c.
The reader may wonder whether our trace preorder v is preserved by more permissive contexts. The
answer is no. Suppose that in the second item of Theorem 1 we allowed a process P that can also read on
sensors. In this case, even if M v N , the parallel process P might read a different value in the two systems at
the very same sensor s (due to the sensor error) and transmit these different values on a free channel, breaking
the congruence. Activities on actuators may also lead to different behaviours of the compound systems:
M and N may have physical components that are not exactly aligned. A similar reasoning applies when
composing CPSs with non physically-disjoint ones: noise on physical devices may break the compositionality
result.
As we are interested in formalising timing aspects of attacks, such as beginning and duration, we propose
a timed variant of v up to (a possibly infinite) discrete time interval m..n, with m ∈ N+ and n ∈ N+ ∪∞.
Intuitively, we write M vm..n N if the CPS N simulates the execution traces of M in all time slots, except
for those contained in the discrete time interval m..n.
Definition 10 (Trace preorder up to a time interval). We write M vm..n N , for m ∈ N+ and n ∈ N+∪{∞},
with m ≤ n, if the following conditions hold:
• m is the minimum integer for which there is a trace t, with #tick(t)=m−1, s.t. M t−−→ and N 6 tˆ==⇒;
• n is the infimum element of N+ ∪{∞}, n ≥ m, such that whenever M t1−−→M ′, with #tick(t1) = n− 1,
there is t2, with #tick(t1) = #tick(t2), such that N
t2−−→ N ′, for some N ′, and M ′ v N ′.
In Definition 10, the first item says that N can simulate the traces of M for at most m−1 time slots;
whereas the second item says two things: (i) in time interval m..n the simulation does not hold; (ii) starting
from the time slot n+1 the CPS N can simulate again the traces of M . Note that inf(∅) = ∞. Thus, if
M vm..∞ N , then N simulates M only in the first m− 1 time slots.
Theorem 2 (Compositionality of vm..n). Let M and N be two arbitrary CPSs in CCPSA.
1. M vm..n N implies that for any physically-disjoint CPS there are m′, n′ ∈ N+ ∪∞, with m′..n′ ⊆ m..n
such that M unionmultiO vm′..n′ N unionmultiO;
2. M vm..n N implies that for any pure-logical process P there are m′, n′ ∈ N+ ∪∞, with m′..n′ ⊆ m..n
such that M ‖ P vm′..n′ N ‖ P ;
3. M vm..n N implies that for any channel c there are m′, n′ ∈ N+ ∪∞, with m′..n′ ⊆ m..n such that
M\c vm′..n′ N\c.
The proof can be found in the appendix.
3 A Running Example
In this section, we introduce a running example to illustrate how we can precisely represent CPSs and a
variety of different physics-based attacks. In practice, we formalise a relatively simple CPS Sys in which
the temperature of an engine is maintained within a specific range by means of a cooling system. We wish
to remark here that while we have kept the example simple, it is actually far from trivial and designed to
describe a wide number of attacks. The main structure of the CPS Sys is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The main structure of the CPS Sys
3.1 The CPS Sys
The physical state State of the engine is characterised by: (i) a state variable temp containing the current
temperature of the engine, and an integer state variable stress keeping track of the level of stress of the
mechanical parts of the engine due to high temperatures (exceeding 9.9 degrees); this integer variable ranges
from 0, meaning no stress, to 5, for high stress; (ii) a sensor st (such as a thermometer or a thermocouple)
measuring the temperature of the engine, (iii) an actuator cool to turn on/off the cooling system.
The physical environment of the engine, Env , is constituted by: (i) a simple evolution law evol that
increases (respectively, decreases) the value of temp by one degree per time unit, when the cooling system is
inactive (respectively, active), up to the uncertainty of the system; the variable stress is increased each time
the current temperature is above 9.9 degrees, and dropped to 0 otherwise; (ii) a measurement map meas
returning the value detected by the sensor st, up to the error associated to the sensor; (iii) an invariant set
saying that the system gets faulty when the temperature of the engine gets out of the range [0, 50], (iv) a
safety set to express that the system moves to an unsafe state when the level of stress reaches the threshold
5, (v) an uncertainty function in which each state variable may evolve with an uncertainty δ = 0.4 degrees,
(vi) a sensor-error function saying that the sensor st has an accuracy  = 0.1 degrees.
Formally, State = 〈ξx, ξs, ξa〉 where:
• ξx ∈ R{temp,stress} and ξx(temp) = 0 and ξx(stress) = 0;
• ξs ∈ R{st} and ξs(st) = 0;
• ξa ∈ R{cool} and ξa(cool) = off; for the sake of simplicity, we can assume ξa to be a mapping
{cool} → {on, off} such that ξa(cool) = off if ξa(cool) ≥ 0, and ξa(cool) = on if ξa(cool) < 0;
and Env = 〈evol ,meas, inv , safe, ξw, ξe〉 with:
• evol(ξix, ξia, ξw) is the set of functions ξ ∈ R{temp,stress} such that:
– ξ(temp) = ξix(temp)+heat(ξia, cool)+γ, with γ ∈ [−δ,+δ] and heat(ξia, cool) = −1 if ξia(cool) = on
(active cooling), and heat(ξia, cool) = +1 if ξia(cool) = off (inactive cooling);
– ξ(stress) = min(5 , ξix(stress)+1) if ξix(temp) > 9.9; ξ(stress) = 0, otherwise;
• meas(ξix, ξe) =
{
ξ : ξ(st) ∈ [ξix(temp)−  , ξix(temp) + ]
}
;
• inv = {ξix : 0 ≤ ξix(temp) ≤ 50};
• safe = {ξix : ξix(stress) < 5} (we recall that the stress threshold is 5);
• ξw ∈ R{temp,stress}, ξw(temp) = 0.4 = δ and ξw(stress) = 0;
• ξe ∈ R{st} and ξe(st) = 0.1 = .
For the cyber component of the CPS Sys, we define two parallel processes: Ctrl and IDS . The former
models the controller activity, consisting in reading the temperature sensor and in governing the cooling
system via its actuator, whereas the latter models a simple intrusion detection system that attempts to
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Figure 3: Three possible evolutions of the CPS Sys
detect and signal anomalies in the behaviour of the system [23]. Intuitively, Ctrl senses the temperature
of the engine at each time slot. When the sensed temperature is above 10 degrees, the controller activates
the coolant. The cooling activity is maintained for 5 consecutive time units. After that time, the controller
synchronises with the IDS component via a private channel sync, and then waits for instructions, via a
channel ins. The IDS component checks whether the sensed temperature is still above 10. If this is the case,
it sends an alarm of “high temperature”, via a specific channel, and then tells Ctrl to keep cooling for 5
more time units; otherwise, if the temperature is not above 10, the IDS component requires Ctrl to stop the
cooling activity.
Ctrl = read st(x).if (x > 10) {Cooling} else {tick.Ctrl}
Cooling = write cool〈on〉.tick5.Check
Check = snd sync.rcv ins(y).if (y = keep_cooling) {tick5.Check} else {write cool〈off〉.tick.Ctrl}
IDS = rcv sync.read st(x).if (x > 10) {snd alarm〈high_temp〉.snd ins〈keep_cooling〉.tick.IDS}
else {snd ins〈stop〉.tick.IDS} .
Thus, the whole CPS is defined as:
Sys = Env ;State on (Ctrl ‖ IDS )\{sync, ins}
For the sake of simplicity, our IDS component is quite basic: for instance, it does not check whether the
temperature is too low. However, it is straightforward to replace it with a more sophisticated one, containing
more informative tests on sensor values and/or on actuators commands.
Figure 3 shows three possible evolutions in time of the state variable temp of Sys: (i) the first one (in
red), in which the temperature of the engine always grows of 1− δ = 0.6 degrees per time unit, when the
cooling is off, and always decrease of 1 + δ = 1.4 degrees per time unit, when the cooling is on; (ii) the second
one (in blue), in which the temperature always grows of 1 + δ = 1.4 degrees per time unit, when the cooling
is off, and always decreases of 1− δ = 0.6 degrees per time unit, when the cooling is on; (iii) and a third one
(in yellow), in which, depending on whether the cooling is off or on, at each time step the temperature grows
or decreases of an arbitrary offset lying in the interval [1− δ, 1 + δ].
Our operational semantics allows us to formally prove a number of properties of our running example.
For instance, Proposition 1 says that the Sys is sound and it never fires the alarm.
Proposition 1. If Sys
t−−→ for some trace t = α1 . . . αn, then αi ∈ {τ, tick}, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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Figure 4: Uppaal SMC model for the physical component of Sys
Actually, we can be quite precise on the temperature reached by Sys before and after the cooling: in each
of the 5 rounds of cooling, the temperature will drop of a value lying in the real interval [1−δ, 1+δ], where δ
is the uncertainty.
Proposition 2. For any execution trace of Sys, we have:
• when Sys turns on the cooling, the value of the state variable temp ranges over (9.9, 11.5];
• when Sys turns off the cooling, the value of the variable temp ranges over (2.9, 8.5].
The proofs of the Propositions 1 and 2 can be found in the associated technical report [39]. In the
following section, we will verify the safety properties stated in these two propositions relying on the statistical
model checker Uppaal SMC [15].
3.2 A formalisation of Sys in Uppaal SMC
In this section, we formalise our running example in Uppaal SMC [15], the statistical extension of the
Uppaal model checker [5] supporting the analysis of systems expressed as composition of timed and/or
probabilistic automata. In Uppaal SMC, the user must specify two main statistical parameters α and ,
ranging in the interval [0, 1], and representing the probability of false negatives and probabilistic uncertainty ,
respectively. Thus, given a CTL property of the system under investigation, the tool returns a probability
estimate for that property, lying in a confidence interval [p− , p+ ], for some probability p ∈ [0, 1], with an
accuracy 1− α. The number of necessary runs to ensure the required accuracy is then computed by the tool
relying on the Chernoff-Hoeffding theory [12].
3.2.1 Model
The Uppaal SMC model of our use case Sys is given by three main components represented in terms of
parallel timed automata: the physical component, the network, and the logical component.
The physical component, whose model is shown in Figure 4, consists of four automata: (i) the _Engine_
automaton that governs the evolution of the variable temp by means of the heat and cool functions; (ii) the
_Sensor_ automaton that updates the global variable sens at each measurement request; (iii) the _Actuator_
automaton that activates/deactivates the cooling system; (iv) the _Safety_ automaton that handles the
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Figure 5: Uppaal SMC model for the network component of Sys
Figure 6: Uppaal SMC model for the logical component of Sys
integer variable stress, via the update_stress function, and the Boolean variables safe and deadlocks, associated
to the safety set safe and the invariant set inv of Sys, respectively.5 We also have a small automaton to
model a discrete notion of time (via a synchronisation channel tick) as the evolution of state variables is
represented via difference equations.
The network, whose model is given in Figure 5, consists of two proxies : a proxy to relay actuator commands
between the actuator device and the controller, a second proxy to relay measurement requests between the
sensor device and the logical components (controller and IDS).
The logical component, whose model is given in Figure 6, consists of two automata: _Ctrl_ and _IDS_
to model the controller and the Intrusion Detection System, respectively; both of them synchronise with their
associated proxy copying a fresh value of sens into their local variables (sens_ctrl and sens_ids, respectively).
Under proper conditions, the _IDS_ automaton fires alarms by setting a Boolean variable alarm.
3.2.2 Verification
We conduct our safety verification using a notebook with the following set-up: (i) 2.8 GHz Intel i7 7700 HQ,
with 16 GB memory, and Linux Ubuntu 16.04 operating system; (ii) Uppaal SMC model-checker 64-bit,
version 4.1.19. The statistical parameters of false negatives (α) and probabilistic uncertainty () are both
set to 0.01, leading to a confidence level of 99%. As a consequence, having fixed these parameters, for each
of our experiments, Uppaal SMC run a number of runs that may vary from a few hundreds to 26492 (cf.
Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds).
We basically use Uppaal SMC to verify properties expressed in terms of time bounded CTL formulae of the
form [t1,t2]eprop and ♦[0,t2]eprop6, where t1 and t2 are time instants according to the discrete representation
5In Section 6.2, we explain why we need to implement an automaton to check for safety conditions rather than verifying a
safety property.
6The 0 in the left-hand side of the time interval is imposed by the syntax of Uppaal SMC.
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of time in Uppaal SMC. In practice, we use formulae of the form [t1,t2]eprop to compute the probability
that a property eprop7 holds in all time slots of the time interval t1..t2, whereas with formulae of the form
♦[0,t2]eprop we calculate the probability that a property eprop holds in a least one time slot of the time interval
0..t2.
Thus, instead of proving Proposition 1, we verify, with a 99% accuracy, that in all possible executions
that are at most 1000 time slots long, the system Sys results to be sound and alarm free, with probability
0.99. Formally, we verify the following three properties:
• [1,1000](¬deadlocks), expressing that the system does not deadlock;
• [1,1000](safe), expressing that the system does not violate the safety conditions;
• [1,1000](¬alarm), expressing that the IDS does not fire any alarm.
Furthermore, instead of Proposition 2, we verify, with the same accuracy and for runs of the same length
(up to a short initial transitory phase lasting 5 time instants) that if the cooling system is off, then the
temperature of the engine lies in the real interval (2.9, 8.5], otherwise it ranges over the interval (9.9, 11.5].
Formally, we verify the following two properties:
• [5,1000](Cooling_off =⇒ (temp > 2.9 ∧ temp ≤ 8.5))
• [5,1000](Cooling_on =⇒ (temp > 9.9 ∧ temp ≤ 11.5)).
The verification of each of the five properties above requires around 15 minutes. The Uppaal SMC models of
our system and the attacks discussed in the next section are available at the repository
https://bitbucket.org/AndreiMunteanu/cps_smc/src/.
Remark 3. In our Uppaal SMC model we decided to represent both uncertainty of physical evolution (in
the functions heat and cool of _Engine_) and measurement noise (in _Sensor_) in a probabilistic manner
via random extractions. Here, the reader may wonder whether it would have been enough to restrict our SMC
analysis by considering only upper and lower bounds on these two quantities. Actually, this is not the case
because such a restricted analysis might miss admissible execution traces. To see this, suppose to work with a
physical uncertainty that is always either 0.4 or −0.4. Then, the temperature reached by the system would
always be of the form n.k, for n, k ∈ N and k even. As a consequence, our analysis would miss all execution
traces in which the system reaches the maximum admissible temperature of 11.5 degrees.
4 Physics-based Attacks
In this section, we use CCPSA to formalise a threat model of physics-based attacks, i.e., attacks that can
manipulate sensor and/or actuator signals in order to drive a sound CPS into an undesired state [55]. An
attack may have different levels of access to physical devices; for example, it might be able to get read access
to the sensors but not write access; or it might get write-only access to the actuators but not read-access.
This level of granularity is very important to model precisely how physics-based attacks can affect a CPS [13].
In CCPSA, we have a syntactic way to distinguish malicious processes from honest ones.
Definition 11 (Honest system). A CPS E;SonP is honest if P is honest, where P is honest if it does not
contain constructs of the form bµ.P1cP2.
We group physics-based attacks in classes that describe both the malicious activities and the timing
aspects of the attack. Intuitively, a class of attacks provides information about which physical devices are
accessed by the attacks of that class, how they are accessed (read and/or write), when the attack begins and
when the attack ends. Thus, let I be the set of all possible malicious activities on the physical devices of a
system, m ∈ N+ be the time slot when an attack starts, and n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞} be the time slot when the attack
ends. We then say that an attack A is of class C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] if:
7eprop is a side-effect free expression over variables (e.g., clock variables, location names and primitive variables) [5].
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1. all possible malicious activities of A coincide with those contained in I;
2. the first of those activities may occur in the mth time slot but not before;
3. the last of those activities may occur in the nth time slot but not after;
4. for ι ∈ I, C(ι) returns a (possibly empty) set of time slots when A may read/tamper with the device ι
(this set is contained in m..n);
5. C is a total function, i.e., if no attacks of class C can achieve the malicious activity ι ∈ I, then C(ι) = ∅.
Definition 12 (Class of attacks). Let I = {Ep? : p ∈ S ∪ A} ∪ {Ep! : p ∈ S ∪ A} be the set of all possible
malicious activities on physical devices. Let m ∈ N+, n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, with m ≤ n. A class of attacks
C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] is a total function such that for any attack A of class C we have:
(i) C(ι) = {k : A t−−→ ιv−−−→ A′ ∧ k = #tick(t) + 1}, for ι ∈ I,
(ii) m = inf{ k : k ∈ C(ι) ∧ ι ∈ I },
(iii) n = sup{ k : k ∈ C(ι) ∧ ι ∈ I }.
Along the lines of [17], we can say that an attack A affects a sound CPS M if the execution of the
compound system M ‖ A differs from that of the original system M , in an observable manner. Basically, a
physics-based attack can influence the system under attack in at least two different ways:
• The systemM ‖ A might deadlock whenM may not; this means that the attack A affects the availability
of the system. We recall that in the context of CPSs, deadlock is a particular severe physical event.
• The system M ‖ A might have non-genuine execution traces containing observables (violations of safety
conditions or communications on channels) that can’t be reproduced by M ; here the attack affects the
integrity of the system behaviour.
Definition 13 (Attack tolerance/vulnerability). Let M be an honest and sound CPS. We say that M is
tolerant to an attack A if M ‖ A v M . We say that M is vulnerable to an attack A if there is a time
interval m..n, with m ∈ N+ and n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, such that M ‖ A vm..n M .
Thus, if a system M is vulnerable to an attack A of class C ∈ [I → P(m..n)], during the time interval
m′..n′, then the attack operates during the interval m..n but it influences the system under attack in the
time interval m′..n′ (obviously, m′ ≥ m). If n′ is finite, then we have a temporary attack, otherwise we have a
permanent attack. Furthermore, if m′−n is big enough and n−m is small, then we have a quick nasty attack
that affects the system late enough to allow attack camouflages [24]. On the other hand, if m′ is significantly
smaller than n, then the attack affects the observable behaviour of the system well before its termination and
the CPS has good chances of undertaking countermeasures to stop the attack. Finally, if M ‖ A t−−→ deadlock−−−−−−−→,
for some trace t, then we say that the attack A is lethal, as it is capable to halt (deadlock) the CPS M . This
is obviously a permanent attack.
Note that, according to Definition 13, the tolerance (or vulnerability) of a CPS also depends on the
capability of the IDS component to detect and signal undesired physical behaviours. In fact, the IDS
component might be designed to detect abnormal physical behaviours going well further than deadlocks and
violations of safety conditions.
According to the literature, we say that an attack is stealthy if it is able to drive the CPS under attack
into an incorrect physical state (either deadlock or violation of the safety conditions) without being noticed
by the IDS component.
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Figure 7: Uppaal SMC model for the attacker Am of Example 1
4.1 Three different attacks on the physical devices of the CPS Sys
In this subsection, we present three different attacks to the CPS Sys described in Section 3. The formal
proofs of the propositions stating the tolerance and/or the vulnerability of Sys with respect to these three
attacks can be found in the associated technical report [39]. Here, we use Uppaal SMC to verify the models
associated to the system under attack in order to detect deadlocks, violations of safety conditions, and IDS
failures.
Example 1. Consider the following DoS/Integrity attack on the the actuator cool , of class C ∈ [I →
P(m..m)] with C(Ecool?) = C(Ecool!) = {m} and C(ι) = ∅, for ι 6∈ {Ecool?, Ecool!}:
Am = tick
m−1.bdrop cool(x).if (x=off) {forge cool〈off〉} else {nil}c .
Here, the attack Am operates exclusively in the mth time slot, when it tries to drop an eventual cooling
command (on or off) coming from the controller, and fabricates a fake command to turn off the cooling
system. Thus, if the controller sends in the mth time slot a command to turn off the coolant, then nothing
bad happens as the attack will put the same message back. On the hand, if the controller sends a command to
turn the cooling on, then the attack will drop the command. We recall that the controller will turn on the
cooling only if the sensed temperature is greater than 10 (and hence temp > 9.9); this may happen only if
m > 8. Since the command to turn the cooling on is never re-sent by Ctrl , the temperature will continue to
rise, and after only 4 time units the system may violate the safety conditions emitting an action unsafe, while
the IDS component will start sending alarms every 5 time units, until the whole system deadlocks because the
temperature reaches the threshold of 50 degrees. Here, the IDS component of Sys is able to detect the attack
with only one time unit delay.
Proposition 3. Let Sys be our running example and Am be the attack defined in Example 1. Then,
• Sys ‖ Am v Sys, for 1 ≤ m ≤ 8,
• Sys ‖ Am vm+4..∞ Sys, for m > 8.
In order to support the statement of Proposition 3 we verify our Uppaal SMC model of Sys in which the
communication network used by the controller to access the actuator is compromised. More precisely, we
replace the _Proxy_Actuator_ automaton of Figure 5 with a compromised one, provided in Figure 7, that
implements the malicious activities of the MITM attacker Am of Example 1.
We have done our analysis, with a 99% accuracy, for execution traces that are at most 1000 time units
long and restricting the attack time m in the time interval 1..300. The results of our analysis are:
• when m ∈ 1..8, the attack is harmless as the system results to be safe, deadlock free and alarm free,
with probability 0.99;
• when m ∈ 9..300, we have the following situation:
– the probability that at the attack time m the controller sends a command to activate the cooling
system (thus, triggering the attacker that will drop the command) can be obtained by verifying
the property ♦[0,m](Cooling_on ∧ global_clock ≥ m); as shown in Figure 8, when m grows in
the time interval 1..300, the resulting probability stabilises around the value 0.096;
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Figure 8: Probability results of ♦[0,m](Cooling_on ∧ global_clock ≥ m) by varying m in 1..300
– up to the m+3th time slot the system under attack remains safe, i.e., both properties [1,m+3](safe)
and [1,m+3](¬deadlock) hold with probability 0.99;
– up to the m+4th time slot no alarms are fired, i.e., the property [1,m+4](¬alarm) holds with
probability 0.99 (no false positives);
– in the m+4th time slot the system under attack might become unsafe as the probability, for
m ∈ 9..300, that the property ♦[0,m+4](¬safe) is satisfied stabilises around the value 0.095;8
– in the m+5th time slot the IDS may fire an alarm as the probability, for m ∈ 9..300, that the
property ♦[0,m+5](alarm) is satisfied stabilises around the value 0.094;9
– the system under attack may deadlock as the property ♦[0,1000](deadlocks) is satisfied with
probability 0.096.10
Example 2. Consider the following DoS/Integrity attack to the sensor st, of class C ∈ [I → P(2..∞)] such
that C(Est?) = {2}, C(Est!) = 2..∞ and C(ι) = ∅, for ι 6∈ {Est!, Est?}. The attack begins is activity in the
time slot m, with m > 8, and then never stops:
Am = tick
m−1.A
A = bsniff st(x).if (x ≤ 10) {B〈x〉} else {tick.A}c
B(y) = bforge st〈y〉.tick.B〈y〉cB〈y〉 .
Here, the attack Am behaves as follows. It sleeps for m− 1 time slots and then, in the following time slot,
it sniffs the current temperature at sensor st. If the sensed temperature v is greater than 10, then it moves to
the next time slot and restarts sniffing; otherwise from that time on it will keep sending the same temperature
v to the logical components (controller and IDS). Actually, once the forgery activity starts, the process Ctrl
will always receive a temperature below 10 and will never activate the cooling system (and consequently the
IDS). As a consequence, the system under attack Sys ‖ A will first move to an unsafe state until the invariant
8Since this probability coincides with that of ♦[0,m](Cooling_on ∧ global_clock ≥ m), it appears very likely that the
activation of the cooling system in the mth time slot triggers the attacker whose activity drags the system into an unsafe state
with a delay of 4 time slots.
9As the two probabilities are pretty much the same, and [1,m+3](safe) and [1,m+4](¬alarm) hold, the IDS seems to be
quite effective in detecting the violations of the safety conditions in the m+4th time slot, with only one time slot delay.
10Since the probabilities are still the same, we argue that when the system reaches an unsafe state then it is not able to recover
and it is doomed to deadlock.
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Figure 9: Uppaal SMC model for the attacker Am of Example 2
will be violated and the system will deadlock. Indeed, in the worst execution scenario, already in the m+1th
time slot the temperature may exceed 10 degrees, and after 4 tick-actions, in the m+5th time slot, the system
may violate the safety conditions emitting an unsafe action. Since the temperature will keep growing without
any cooling activity, the deadlock of the CPS cannot be avoided. This is a lethal attack, as it causes a shut
down of the system; it is also a stealthy attack as it remains undetected because the IDS never gets into
action.
Proposition 4. Let Sys be our running example and Am, for m > 8, be the attack defined in Example 2.
Then Sys ‖ Am vm+5..∞ Sys.
Here, we verify the Uppaal SMC model of Sys in which we assume that its sensor device is compromised
(we recall that our MITM forgery attack on sensors or actuators can be assimilated to device compromise).
In particular, we replace the _Sensor_ automaton of Figure 4 with a compromised one, provided in Figure 9,
and implementing the malicious activities of the MITM attacker Am of Example 2.
We have done our analysis, with a 99% accuracy, for execution traces that are at most 1000 time units
long and restricting the attack time m in the integer interval 9..300. The results of our analysis are:
• up to the m+4th time slot the system under attack remains safe, deadlock free, and alarm free, i.e., all
three properties [1,m+4](safe), [1,m+4](¬deadlock), and [1,m+4](¬alarm) hold with probability 0.99;
• in the m+5th time slot the system under attack might become unsafe as the probability, for m ∈ 9..300,
that the property ♦[0,m+5](¬safe) is satisfied stabilises around 0.104;
• the system under attack will eventually deadlock not later that 80 time slots after the attack time m,
as the property [m+80,1000](deadlocks) is satisfied with probability 0.99;
• finally, the attack is stealthy as the property [1,1000](¬alarm) holds with probability 0.99.
Now, let us examine a similar but less severe attack.
Example 3. Consider the following DoS/Integrity attack to sensor st, of class C ∈ [I → P(1..n)], with
C(Est!) = C(Est?) = 1..n and C(ι) = ∅, for ι 6∈ {Est!, Est?}:
An = bsniff st(x).bforge st〈x−4〉.tick.An−1cAn−1cAn−1, for n > 0
A0 = nil .
In this attack, for n consecutive time slots, An sends to the logical components (controller and IDS) the
current sensed temperature decreased by an offset 4. The effect of this attack on the system depends on the
duration n of the attack itself: (i) for n ≤ 8, the attack is harmless as the variable temp may not reach
a (critical) temperature above 9.9; (ii) for n = 9, the variable temp might reach a temperature above 9.9
in the 9th time slot, and the attack would delay the activation of the cooling system of one time slot; as a
consequence, the system might get into an unsafe state in the time interval 14..15, but no alarm will be fired;
(iii) for n ≥ 10, the system may get into an unsafe state in the time slot 14 and in the following n+ 11 time
slots; in this case, this would not be stealthy attack as the IDS will fire the alarm with a delay of at most two
time slots later, rather this is a temporary attack that ends in the time slot n+ 11.
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Figure 10: Uppaal SMC model for the attacker An of Example 3
Proposition 5. Let Sys be our use case and An be the attack defined in Example 3. Then:
• Sys ‖ An v Sys, for n ≤ 8,
• Sys ‖ An v14..15 Sys, for n = 9,
• Sys ‖ An v14..n+11 Sys, for n ≥ 10.
Here, we verify the Uppaal SMC model of Sys in which we replace the _Proxy_Sensor_ automaton
of Figure 5 with a compromised one, provided in Figure 10, and implementing the MITM activities of the
attacker An of Example 3.
We have done our analysis, with a 99% accuracy, for execution traces that are at most 1000 time units
long, and assuming that the duration of the attack n may vary in the integer interval 1..300. The results of
our analysis are:
• when n ∈ 1..8, the system under attack remains safe, deadlock free, and alarm free, i.e., all three
properties [1,1000](safe), [1,1000](¬deadlock), and [1,1000](¬alarm) hold with probability 0.99;
• when n = 9, we have the following situation:
– the system under attack is deadlock free, i.e., the property [1,1000](¬deadlock) holds with proba-
bility 0.99;
– the system remains safe and alarm free, except for the time interval 14..15, i.e., all the follow-
ing properties [1,13](safe), [1,13](¬alarm), [16,1000](safe), and [16,1000](¬alarm) hold with
probability 0.99;
– in the time interval 14..15, we may have violations of safety conditions, as the property ♦[0,14](¬safe ∧
global_clock ≥ 14) is satisfied with a probability 0.62, while the property ♦[0,15](¬safe ∧
global_clock ≥ 15) is satisfied with probability 0.21; both violations are stealthy as the property
[14,15](¬alarm) holds with probability 0.99;
• when n ≥ 10, we have the following situation:
– the system is deadlock free, i.e., the property [1,1000](¬deadlock) holds with probability 0.99;
– the system remains safe except for the time interval 14..n+11, i.e., the two properties [1,13](safe)
and [n+12,1000](safe) hold with probability 0.99;
– the system is alarm free except for the time interval n+1..n+11, i.e., the two properties[0,n](¬alarm)
and [n+12,1000](¬alarm) hold with probability 0.99;
– in the 14th time slot the system under attack may reach an unsafe state as the probability, for
n ∈ 10..300, that the property ♦[0,14](¬safe ∧ global_clock ≥ 14) is satisfied stabilises around
0.548;
– once the attack has terminated, in the time interval n+1..n+11, the system under attack has
good chances to reach an unsafe state as the probability, for n ∈ 10..300, that the property
♦[0,n+11](¬safe ∧ n+1 ≤ global_clock ≤ n+11) is satisfied stabilises around 0.672;
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– the violations of the safety conditions remain completely stealthy only up to the duration n of
the attack (we recall that [0,n](¬alarm) is satisfied with probability 0.99); the probability, for
n ∈ 10..300, that the property ♦[0,n+11](alarm) is satisfied stabilises around 0.13; thus, in the time
interval n+1..n+11, only a small portion of violations of safety conditions are detected by the IDS
while a great majority of them remains stealthy.
4.2 A technique for proving attack tolerance/vulnerability
In this subsection, we provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability to attacks of an arbitrary
class C. Actually, we do more than that: we provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability
to all attacks of any class C ′ that is somehow “weaker” than a given class C.
Definition 14. Let Ci ∈ [I → P(mi..ni)], for i ∈ {1, 2}, be two classes of attacks, with m1..n1 ⊆ m2..n2.
We say that C1 is weaker than C2, written C1  C2, if C1(ι) ⊆ C2(ι) for any ι ∈ I.
Intuitively, if C1  C2 then: (i) the attacks of class C1 might achieve fewer malicious activities than any
attack of class C2 (formally, there may be ι ∈ I such that C1(ι) = ∅ and C2(ι) 6= ∅); (ii) for those malicious
activities ι ∈ I achieved by the attacks of both classes C1 and C2 (i.e., C1(ι) 6= ∅ and C2(ι) 6= ∅), if they may
be perpetrated by the attacks of class C1 at some time slot k ∈ m1..n1 (i.e., k ∈ C1(ι)) then all attacks of
class C2 may do the same activity ι at the same time k (i.e., k ∈ C2(ι)).
The next objective is to define a notion of most powerful attack (also called top attacker) of a given class
C, such that, if a CPS M tolerates the most powerful attack of class C then it also tolerates any attack
of class C ′, with C ′  C. We will provide a similar condition for attack vulnerability: let M be a CPS
vulnerable to Top(C) in the time interval m1..n1; then, for any attack A of class C ′, with C ′  C, if M is
vulnerable to A then it is so for a smaller time interval m2..n2 ⊆ m1..n1.
Our notion of top attacker has two extra ingredients with respect to the physics-based attacks seen up to
now: (i) nondeterminism, and (ii) time-unguarded recursive processes. This extra power of the top attacker
is not a problem as we are looking for sufficient criteria.
With respect to nondeterminism, we assume a generic procedure rnd() that given an arbitrary set Z returns
an element of Z chosen in a nondeterministic manner. This procedure allows us to express nondeterministic
choice, P ⊕Q, as an abbreviation for the process if (rnd({true, false})) {P} else {Q}. Thus, let ι ∈ {Ep? : p ∈
S ∪A}∪ {Ep! : p ∈ S ∪A}, m ∈ N+, n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, with m ≤ n, and T ⊆ m..n, we define the attack process
Att(ι, k, T )11 as the attack which may achieve the malicious activity ι, at the time slot k, and which tries to do
the same in all subsequent time slots of T .
Formally,
Att(Ea?, k, T ) = if (k ∈ T ) {(bdrop a(x).Att(Ea?, k, T )cAtt(Ea?, k+1, T )) ⊕ tick.Att(Ea?, k+1, T )}
else {if (k < sup(T )) {tick.Att(Ea?, k+1, T )} else {nil}}
Att(Es?, k, T ) = if (k ∈ T ) {(bsniff s(x).Att(Es?, k, T )cAtt(Es?, k+1, T )) ⊕ tick.Att(Es?, k+1, T )}
else {if (k < sup(T )) {tick.Att(Es?, k+1, T )} else {nil}}
Att(Ep!, k, T ) = if (k ∈ T ) {(bforge p〈rnd(R)〉.Att(Ep!, k, T )cAtt(Ep!, k+1, T ))⊕ tick.Att(Ep!, k+1, T )}
else {if (k < sup(T )) {tick.Att(Ep!, k+1, T )} else {nil}} .
Note that, for T = ∅, we assume sup(T ) = −∞. We can now use the definition above to formalise the
notion of most powerful attack of a given class C.
Definition 15 (Top attacker). Let C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] be a class of attacks. We define
Top(C) =
∏
ι∈I
Att(ι, 1, C(ι))
as the most powerful attack, or top attacker, of class C.
11In case of sensor sniffing, we might avoid to add this specific attack process as our top attacker process can forge any possible
value without need to read sensors.
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Figure 11: Uppaal SMC model for the top attacker Top(Cm) of Example 4
The following theorem provides soundness criteria for attack tolerance and attack vulnerability.
Theorem 3 (Soundness criteria). Let M be an honest and sound CPS, C an arbitrary class of attacks, and
A an attack of a class C ′, with C ′  C.
• If M ‖ Top(C) v M then M ‖ A v M .
• If M ‖ Top(C) vm1..n1 M then either M ‖ A vM or M ‖ A vm2..n2 M , with m2..n2 ⊆ m1..n1.
Corollary 1. Let M be an honest and sound CPS, and C a class of attacks. If Top(C) is not lethal for M
then any attack A of class C ′, with C ′  C, is not lethal for M . If Top(C) is not a permanent attack for M ,
then any attack A of class C ′, with C ′  C, is not a permanent attack for M .
The following example illustrates how Theorem 3 could be used to infer attack tolerance/vulnerability
with respect to an entire class of attacks.
Example 4. Consider our running example Sys and a class of attacks Cm, for m ∈ N, such that Cm(Ecool?) =
Cm(Ecool!) = {m} and Cm(ι) = ∅, for ι 6∈ {Ecool?, Ecool!}. Attacks of class Cm may tamper with the actuator
cool only in the time slot m (i.e., in the time interval m..m). The attack Am of Example 1 is of class Cm.
In the following analysis in Uppaal SMC of the top attacker Top(Cm), we will show that both the
vulnerability window and the probability of successfully attacking the system represent an upper bound for
the attack Am of Example 1 of class Cm. Technically, we verify the Uppaal SMC model of Sys in which we
replace the _Proxy_Actuator_ automaton of Figure 5 with a compromised one, provided in Figure 11, and
implementing the activities of the top attacker Top(Cm). We carry out our analysis with a 99% accuracy, for
execution traces that are at most 1000 time slots long, limiting the attack time m to the integer interval
1..300.
To explain our analysis further, let us provide details on how Top(Cm) affects Sys when compared to the
attacker Am of class Cm seen in the Example 1.
• In the time interval 1..m, the attacked system remains safe, deadlock free, and alarm free. Formally, the
three properties [1,m](safe), [1,m](¬deadlock) and [1,m](¬alarm) hold with probability 0.99. Thus,
in this time interval, the top attacker is harmless, as well as Am.
• In the time interval m+1..m+3, the system exposed to the top attacker may deadlock when m ∈ 1..8;
for m > 8 the system under attack is deadlock free (see Figure 12). This is because the top attacker,
unlike the attacker Am, can forge in the first 8 time slots cool-on commands turning on the cooling and
dropping the temperature below zero in the time interval m+1..m+3. Note that no alarms or unsafe
behaviours occur in this case, as neither the safety process nor the IDS check whether the temperature
drops below a certain threshold. Formally, the properties [m+1,m+3](safe) and [m+1,m+3](¬alarm)
hold with probability 0.99, as already seen for the attacker Am.
• In the time interval m+4..1000, the top attacker has better chances to deadlock the system when
compared with the attacker Am (see Figure 13). With respect to safety and alarms, the top at-
tacker and the attacker Am have the same probability of success (the properties [m+4,1000](safe) and
[m+4,1000](¬alarm) return the same probability results).
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Figure 12: Results of ♦[0,m+3](deadlock ∧ global_clock ≥ m+ 1) by varying the attack time m
Figure 13: Results of ♦[0,1000](deadlock ∧ global_clock ≥ m+ 4) by varying the attack time m
This example shows how the verification of a top attacker Top(C) provides an upper bound of the
effectiveness of the entire class of attacks C, in terms of both vulnerability window and probability of
successfully attack the system. Of course, the accuracy of such approximation cannot be estimated a priori.
5 Impact of a physics-based attack
In the previous section, we have grouped physics-based attacks by focussing on the physical devices under
attack and the timing aspects of the attack (Definition 12). Then, we have provided a formalisation of when
a CPS should be considered tolerant/vulnerable to an attack (Definition 13). In this section, we show that
these two formalisations are important not only to demonstrate the tolerance (or vulnerability) of a CPS
with respect to certain attacks, but also to evaluate the disruptive impact of those attacks on the target
CPS [21, 44].
The goal of this section is to provide a formal metric to estimate the impact of a successful attack on the
physical behaviour of a CPS. In particular, we focus on the ability that an attack may have to drag a CPS
out of the correct behaviour modelled by its evolution map, with the given uncertainty.
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Recall that evol is monotone with respect to the uncertainty. Thus, as stated in Proposition 6, an
increase of the uncertainty may translate into a widening of the range of the possible behaviours of the CPS.
In the following, given the physical environment E = 〈evol ,meas, inv , safe, ξw, ξe〉, we write E[ξw ← ξ′w]
as an abbreviation for 〈evol ,meas, inv , safe, ξ′w, ξe〉; similarly, for M = E;SonP we write M [ξw ← ξ′w] for
E[ξw ← ξ′w];SonP .
Proposition 6 (Monotonicity). Let M be an honest and sound CPS with uncertainty ξw. If ξw ≤ ξ′w and
M
t−−→M ′ then M [ξw ← ξ′w]
t−−→M ′[ξw ← ξ′w].
However, a wider uncertainty in the model does not always correspond to a widening of the possible
behaviours of the CPS. In fact, this depends on the intrinsic tolerance of a CPS with respect to changes in
the uncertainty function. In the following, we will write ξw + ξ′w to denote the function ξ′′w ∈ RX such that
ξ′′w(x) = ξw(x) + ξ
′
w(x), for any x ∈ X .
Definition 16 (System ξ-tolerance). An honest and sound CPS M with uncertainty ξw is said ξ-tolerant,
for ξ ∈ RX and ξ ≥ 0, if
ξ = sup
{
ξ′ : M [ξw ← ξw + η] vM, for any 0 ≤ η ≤ ξ′
}
.
Intuitively, if a CPS M has been designed with a given uncertainty ξw, but M is actually ξ-tolerant, with
ξ > 0, then the uncertainty ξw is somehow underestimated: the real uncertainty of M is given by ξw + ξ.
This information is quite important when trying to estimate the impact of an attack on a CPS. In fact, if a
system M has been designed with a given uncertainty ξw, but M is actually ξ-tolerant, with ξ > 0, then an
attack has (at least) a “room for manoeuvre” ξ to degrade the whole CPS without being observed (and hence
detected).
Let Sys be our running example. In the rest of the section, with an abuse of notation, we will write
Sys[δ ← γ] to denote Sys where the uncertainty δ of the variable temp has been replaced with γ.
Example 5. The CPS Sys is 120 -tolerant as sup
{
ξ′ : Sys[δ ← δ+η] v Sys, for 0 ≤ η ≤ ξ′} is equal to 120 .
Since δ + ξ = 820 +
1
20 =
9
20 , then this statement relies on the following proposition whose proof can be found
in the associated technical report [39].
Proposition 7. We have
• Sys[δ ← γ] v Sys, for γ ∈ ( 820 , 920 ),
• Sys[δ ← γ] 6v Sys, for γ > 920 .
Now everything is in place to define our metric to estimate the impact of an attack.
Definition 17 (Impact). Let M be an honest and sound CPS with uncertainty ξw. We say that an attack A
has definitive impact ξ on the system M if
ξ = inf
{
ξ′ : ξ′ ∈ RX ∧ ξ′>0 ∧ M ‖ A v M [ξw ← ξw + ξ′]
}
.
It has pointwise impact ξ on the system M at time m if
ξ= inf
{
ξ′ : ξ′ ∈ RX ∧ ξ′>0 ∧ M ‖ A vm..n M [ξw ← ξw + ξ′], n ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}
}
.
Intuitively, the impact of an attacker A on a system M measures the perturbation introduced by the
presence of the attacker in the compound system M ‖ A with respect to the original system M . With this
definition, we can establish either the definitive (and hence maximum) impact of the attack A on the system
M , or the impact at a specific time m. In the latter case, by definition of vm..n, there are two possibilities:
either the impact of the attack keeps growing after time m, or in the time interval m+1, the system under
attack deadlocks.
The impact of Top(C) provides an upper bound for the impact of all attacks of class C ′, C ′  C, as
shown in the following theorem (proved in the appendix).
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Theorem 4 (Top attacker’s impact). Let M be an honest and sound CPS, and C an arbitrary class of
attacks. Let A be an arbitrary attack of class C ′, with C ′  C.
• The definitive impact of Top(C) on M is greater than or equal to the definitive impact of A on M .
• If Top(C) has pointwise impact ξ on M at time m, and A has pointwise impact ξ′ on M at time m′,
with m′ ≤ m, then ξ′ ≤ ξ.
In order to help the intuition on the impact metric defined in Definition 17, we give a couple of examples.
Here, we focus on the role played by the size of the vulnerability window.
Example 6. Let us consider the attack An of Example 3, for n ∈ {8, 9, 10}. Then,
• A8 has definitive impact 0 on Sys,
• A9 has definitive impact 0.23 on Sys,
• A10 has definitive impact 0.4 on Sys.
Formally, the impacts of these three attacks are obtained by calculating
inf{ξ′ : ξ′ > 0 ∧ Sys ‖ An v Sys[δ ← δ + ξ′]} ,
for n ∈ {8, 9, 10}. Attack A9 has a very low impact on Sys as it may drag the system into a temporary unsafe
state in the time interval 14..15, whereas A10 has a slightly stronger impact as it may induce a temporary
unsafe state during the larger time interval 14..21. Technically, since δ + ξ = 0.4 + 0.4 = 0.8, the calculation
of the impact of A10 relies on the following proposition whose proof can be found in the associated technical
report [39].
Proposition 8. Let A10 be the attack defined in Example 3. Then:
• Sys ‖ A10 6v Sys[δ ← γ], for γ ∈ (0.4, 0.8),
• Sys ‖ A10 v Sys[δ ← γ], for γ > 0.8.
On the other hand, the attack provided in Example 2, driving the system to a (permanent) deadlock state,
has a much stronger impact on the CPS Sys than the attack of Example 3.
Example 7. Let us consider the attack Am of Example 2, for m > 8. As already discussed, this is a stealthy
lethal attack that has a very severe and high impact. In fact, it has a definitive impact of 8.5 on the CPS Sys.
Formally,
8.5 = inf
{
ξ′ : ξ′ > 0 ∧ Sys ‖ Am v Sys[δ ← δ + ξ′]
}
.
Technically, since δ+ ξ = 0.4+ 8.5 = 8.9, what stated in this example relies on the following proposition whose
proof can be found in the associated technical report [39].
Proposition 9. Let Am be the attack defined in Example 2. Then:
• Sys ‖ Am 6v Sys[δ ← γ], for γ ∈ (0.4, 8.9),
• Sys ‖ Am v Sys[δ ← γ], for γ > 8.9.
Thus, Definition 17 provides an instrument to estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS in
terms of the perturbation introduced both on its physical and on its logical processes. However, there is at
least another question that a CPS designer could ask: “Is there a way to estimate the chances that an attack
will be successful during the execution of my CPS?” To paraphrase in a more operational manner: how many
execution traces of my CPS are prone to be attacked by a specific attack? As argued in the future work, we
believe that probabilistic metrics might reveal to be very useful in this respect [41].
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6 Conclusions, related and future work
6.1 Summary
We have provided theoretical foundations to reason about and formally detect attacks to physical devices of
CPSs. A straightforward utilisation of these methodologies is for model-checking or monitoring in order to be
able to formally analyse security properties of CPSs either before system deployment or, when static analysis
is not feasible, at runtime to promptly detect undesired behaviours. To that end, we have proposed a hybrid
process calculus, called CCPSA, as a formal specification language to model physical and cyber components
of CPSs as well as MITM physics-based attacks. Note that our calculus is general enough to represent
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems as cyber components which can easily interact
with controllers and IDSs via channel communications. SCADA systems are the main technology used by
system engineers to supervise the activities of complex CPSs.
Based on CCPSA and its labelled transition semantics, we have formalised a threat model for CPSs by
grouping physics-based attacks in classes, according to the target physical devices and two timing parameters:
begin and duration of the attacks. Then, we developed two different compositional trace semantics for CCPSA
to assess attack tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given attack. Such a tolerance may hold ad infinitum
or for a limited amount of time. In the latter case, the CPS under attack is vulnerable and the attack affects
the observable behaviour of the system only after a certain point in time, when the attack itself may already
be achieved or still working.
Along the lines of GNDC [17], we have defined a notion of top attacker, Top(C), of a given class of attacks
C, which has been used to provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability to all attacks of
class C (and weaker ones).
Then, we have provided a metric to estimate the maximum impact introduced in the system under attack
with respect to its genuine behaviour, according to its evolution law and the uncertainty of the model. We
have proved that the impact of the most powerful attack Top(C) represents an upper bound for the impact
of any attack A of class C (and weaker ones).
Finally, we have formalised a running example in Uppaal SMC [15], the statistical extension of the
Uppaal model checker [5]. Our goal was to test Uppaal SMC as an automatic tool for the static security
analysis of a simple but significant CPS exposed to a number of different physics-based attacks with different
impacts on the system under attack. Here, it is important to note that, although we have verified most of the
properties stated in the paper, we have not been able to capture time properties on the responsiveness of the
IDS to violations of the safety conditions. Examples of such properties are: (i) there are time slots m and k
such that the system may have an unsafe state at some time n > m, and the IDS detects this violation with
a delay of at least k time slots (k being a lower bound of the reaction time of the IDS), or (ii) there is a time
slot n in which the IDS fires an alarm but neither an unsafe state nor a deadlock occurs in the time interval
n−k..n+k: this would provide a tolerance of the occurrence of false positive. Furthermore, Uppaal SMC
does not support the verification of nested formulae. Thus, although from a designer’s point of view it would
have been much more practical to verify a logic formula of the form ∃♦([t,t+5]temp > 9.9) to check safety
and invariant conditions, in Uppaal SMC we had to implement a _Safety_ automaton that is not really
part of our CPS (for more details see the discussion of related work).
6.2 Related work
A number of approaches have been proposed for modelling CPSs using hybrid process algebras [14, 7, 57, 52, 20].
Among these approaches, our calculus CCPSA shares some similarities with the φ-calculus [52]. However,
unlike CCPSA, in the φ-calculus, given a hybrid system (E,P ), the process P can dynamically change the
evolution law in E. Furthermore, the φ-calculus does not have a representation of physical devices and
measurement law, which are instead crucial for us to model physics-based attacks that operate in a timely
fashion on sensors and actuators. More recently, Galpin et al. [20] have proposed a process algebra in which
the continuous part of the system is represented by appropriate variables whose changes are determined by
active influences (i.e., commands on actuators).
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Many good surveys on the security of cyber-physical systems have been published recently (see, e.g.,
[23, 62, 2, 63]), including a survey of surveys [22]. In particular, the surveys [63, 62] provide a systematic
categorisation of 138 selected papers on CPS security. Among those 138 papers, 65 adopt a discrete notion of
time similar to ours, 26 a continuous one, 55 a quasi-static time model, and the rest use a hybrid time model.
This study encouraged us in adopting a discrete time model for physical processes rather than a continuous
one. Still, one might wonder what is actually lost when one adopts a discrete rather than a continuous time
model, in particular when the attacker has the possibility to move in a continuous time setting. A continuous
time model is, of course, more expressive. For instance, Kanovich et al. [32] identified a novel vulnerability in
the context of cryptographic protocols for CPSs in which the attacker works in a continuous-time setting to
fool discrete-time verifiers. However, we believe that, for physics-based attacks, little is lost by adopting a
discrete time model. In fact, sensor measurements and actuator commands are elaborated within controllers,
which are digital devices with an intrinsic discrete notion of time. In particular, with respect to dropping of
actuator commands and forging of sensor measurements, there are no differences between discrete-time and
continuous-time attackers given that to achieve those malicious activities the attacker has to synchronise
with the controller. Thus, there remain only two potential malicious activities: sensor sniffing and forging of
actuator commands. Can a continuous-time attacker, able to carry out these two malicious activities, be
more disruptive than a similar attacker adopting a discrete-time model? This would only be the case when
dealing with very rare physical processes changing their physical state in an extremely fast way, faster than
the controller which is the one dictating the discrete time of the CPS. However, we believe that CPSs of this
kind would be hardly controllable as they would pose serious safety issues even in the absence of any attacker.
The survey [23] provides an exhaustive review of papers on physics-based anomaly detection proposing a
unified taxonomy, whereas the survey [2] presents the main solutions in the estimation of the consequences of
cyber-attacks, attacks modelling and detection, and the development of security architecture (the main types
of attacks and threats against CPSs are analysed and grouped in a tree structure).
Huang et al. [30] were among the first to propose threat models for CPSs. Along with [33, 34], they
stressed the role played by timing parameters on integrity and DoS attacks.
Gollmann et al. [24] discussed possible goals (equipment damage, production damage, compliance violation)
and stages (access, discovery, control, damage, cleanup) of physics-based attacks. In this article, we focused
on the “damage” stage, where the attacker already has a rough idea of the plant and the control architecture
of the target CPS.As we remarked in Section 1, here we focus on an attacker who has already entered the
CPS, without considering how the attacker gained access to the system, which could have happened in several
ways, for instance by attacking an Internet-accessible controller or one of the communication protocols.
Almost all papers discussed in the surveys mentioned above [63, 23, 2] investigate attacks on CPSs and
their protection by relying on simulation test systems to validate the results, rather than formal methodologies.
We are aware of a number of works applying formal methods to CPS security, although they apply methods,
and most of the time have goals, that are quite different from ours. We discuss the most significant ones on
the following.
Burmester et al. [11] employed hybrid timed automata to give a threat framework based on the traditional
Byzantine faults model for crypto-security. However, as remarked in [55], physics-based attacks and faults
have inherently distinct characteristics. Faults are considered as physical events that affect the system
behaviour where simultaneous events don’t act in a coordinated way, whereas cyber attacks may be performed
over a significant number of attack points and in a coordinated way.
In [59], Vigo presented an attack scenario that addresses some of the peculiarities of a cyber-physical
adversary, and discussed how this scenario relates to other attack models popular in the security protocol
literature. Then, in [60] Vigo et al. proposed an untimed calculus of broadcasting processes equipped with
notions of failed and unwanted communication. These works differ quite considerably from ours, e.g., they
focus on DoS attacks without taking into consideration timing aspects or impact of the attack.
Cómbita et al. [13] and Zhu and Basar [64] applied game theory to capture the conflict of goals between
an attacker who seeks to maximise the damage inflicted to a CPS’s security and a defender who aims to
minimise it [43].
Rocchetto and Tippenhauer [51] introduced a taxonomy of the diverse attacker models proposed for CPS
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security and outline requirements for generalised attacker models; in [50], they then proposed an extended
Dolev-Yao attacker model suitable for CPSs. In their approach, physical layer interactions are modelled as
abstract interactions between logical components to support reasoning on the physical-layer security of CPSs.
This is done by introducing additional orthogonal channels. Time is not represented.
Nigam et al. [46] worked around the notion of Timed Dolev-Yao Intruder Models for Cyber-Physical
Security Protocols by bounding the number of intruders required for the automated verification of such
protocols. Following a tradition in security protocol analysis, they provide an answer to the question: How
many intruders are enough for verification and where should they be placed? They also extend the strand
space model to CPS protocols by allowing for the symbolic representation of time, so that they can use the
tool Maude [47] along with SMT support. Their notion of time is however different from ours, as they focus
on the time a message needs to travel from an agent to another. The paper does not mention physical devices,
such as sensors and/or actuators.
There are a few approaches that carry out information flow security analysis on discrete/continuous
models for CPSs. Akella et al. [1] proposed an approach to perform information flow analysis, including
both trace-based analysis and automated analysis through process algebra specification. This approach has
been used to verify process algebra models of a gas pipeline system and a smart electric power grid system.
Bodei et al. [9] proposed a process calculus supporting a control flow analysis that safely approximates the
abstract behaviour of IoT systems. Essentially, they track how data spread from sensors to the logics of
the network, and how physical data are manipulated. In [8], the same authors extend their work to infer
quantitative measures to establish the cost of possibly security countermeasures, in terms of time and energy.
Another discrete model has been proposed by Wang [61], where Petri-net models have been used to verify
non-deducibility security properties of a natural gas pipeline system. More recently, Bohrer and Platzer [10]
introduced dHL, a hybrid logic for verifying cyber-physical hybrid-dynamic information flows, communicating
information through both discrete computation and physical dynamics, so security is ensured even when
attackers observe continuously-changing values in continuous time.
Huang et al. [29] proposed a risk assessment method that uses a Bayesian network to model the attack
propagation process and infers the probabilities of sensors and actuators to be compromised. These probabili-
ties are fed into a stochastic hybrid system (SHS) model to predict the evolution of the physical process being
controlled. Then, the security risk is quantified by evaluating the system availability with the SHS model.
As regards tools for the formal verification of CPSs, we remark that we tried to verify our case study using
model-checking tools for distributed systems such as PRISM [36], Uppaal [6], Real-Time Maude [47], and
prohver within the MODEST TOOLSET [26]. In particular, as our example adopts a discrete notion of time, we
started looking at tools supporting discrete time. PRISM, for instance, relies on Markov decision processes or
discrete-time Markov chains, depending on whether one is interested in modelling nondeterminism or not. It
supports the verification of both CTL and LTL properties (when dealing with nonprobabilistic systems). This
allowed us to express the formula ∃♦([t,t+5]temp > 9.9) to verify violations of the safety conditions, avoiding
the implementation of the _Safety_ automaton. However, using integer variables to represent state variables
with a fixed precision requires the introduction of extra transitions (to deal with nondeterministic errors),
which significantly complicates the PRISM model. In this respect, Uppaal appears to be more efficient than
PRISM, as we have been able to concisely express the error occurring in integer state variables thanks to the
select() construct, in which the user can fix the granularity adopted to approximate a dense interval. This
discrete representation provides an under-approximation of the system behaviour; thus, a finer granularity
translates into an exponential increase of the complexity of the system, with obvious consequences on the
verification performance. Then, we tried to model our case study in Real-Time Maude, a completely different
framework for real-time systems, based on rewriting logic. The language supports object-like inheritance
features that are quite helpful to represent complex systems in a modular manner. We used communication
channels to implement our attacks on the physical devices. Furthermore, we used rational variables for a more
concise discrete representation of state variables. We have been able to verify LTL and T-CTL properties,
although the verification process resulted to be quite slow due to a proliferation of rewriting rules when fixing
a reasonable granularity to approximate dense intervals. As the verification logic is quite powerful, there is
no need to implement an ad hoc process to check for safety. Finally, we also tried to model our case study
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in the safety model checker prohver within the MODEST TOOLSET (see [38]). We specified our case study in
the high-level language HMODEST, supporting: (i) differential inclusion to model linear CPSs with constant
bounded derivatives; (ii) linear formulae to express nondeterministic assignments within a dense interval; (iii)
a compositional programming style inherited from process algebra; (iv) shared actions to synchronise parallel
components. However, we faced the same performance limitations encountered in Uppaal. Thus, we decided
to move to statistical model checking.
Finally, this article extends the preliminary conference version [40] in the following aspects: (i) the calculus
has been slightly redesigned by distinguishing physical state and physical environment, adding specifying
constructs to sniff, drop and forge packets, and removing, for simplicity, protected physical devices; (ii) the
two trace semantics have been proven to be compositional, i.e., preserved by properly defined contexts;
(iii) both our running example Sys and the attacks proposed in Examples 1, 2, 3 and 4 have been implemented
and verified in Uppaal SMC.
6.3 Future work
While much is still to be done, we believe that our paper provides a stepping stone for the development
of formal and automated tools to analyse the security of CPSs. We will consider applying, possibly after
proper enhancements, existing tools and frameworks for automated security protocol analysis, resorting to
the development of a dedicated tool if existing ones prove not up to the task. We will also consider further
security properties and concrete examples of CPSs, as well as other kinds of physics-based attacks,such as
delays in the communication of measurements and/or commands, and periodic attacks, i.e., attacks that
operate in a periodic fashion inducing periodic physical effects on the targeted system that may be easily
confused by engineers with system malfunctions. This will allow us to refine the classes of attacks we have
given here (e.g., by formalising a type system amenable to static analysis), and provide a formal definition of
when a CPS is more secure than another so as to be able to design, by progressive refinement, secure variants
of a vulnerable CPSs.
We also aim to extend the behavioural theory of CCPSA by developing suitable probabilistic metrics to take
into consideration the probability of a specific trace to actually occur. We have already done some progress
in this direction for a variant of CCPSA with no security features in it, by defining ad hoc compositional
bisimulation metrics [42]. In this manner, we believe that our notion of impact might be refined by taking
into account quantitative aspects of an attack such as the probability of being successful when targeting a
specific CPS. A first attempt on a (much) simpler IoT setting can be found in [41].
Finally, with respect to automatic approximations of the impact, while we have not yet fully investigated
the problem, we believe that we can transform it into a “minimum problem”. For instance, if the environment
uses linear functions, then, by adapting techniques developed for linear hybrid automata (see, e.g., [3]), the set
of all traces with length at most n (for a fixed n) can be characterised by a system of first degree inequalities,
so the measure of the impact could be translated into a linear programming problem.
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A Proofs
As already stated in Remark 2, our trace preorder v is deadlock-sensitive. Formally,
Lemma 1. Let M and N be two CPSs in CCPSA such that M v N . Then, M satisfies its system invariant
if and only if N satisfies its system invariant.
Proof. This is because CPSs that don’t satisfy their invariant can only fire deadlock actions.
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the three statements separately.
1. Let us prove that M unionmulti O t−−→ M ′ unionmulti O′ entails N unionmulti O tˆ==⇒ N ′ unionmulti O′. The proof is by induction on the
length of the trace M unionmultiO t−−→M ′ unionmultiO′.
As M v N , by an application of Lemma 1 it follows that either both M and N satisfy their respective
invariants or they both don’t. In the latter case, the result would be easy to prove as the systems can
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only fire deadlock actions. Similarly, if the system invariant of O is not satisfied, then M unionmultiO and N unionmultiO
can perform only deadlock actions and again the result would follow easily. Thus, let us suppose that
the system invariants of M , N and O are satisfied.
Base case. We suppose M = E1;S1onP1, N = E2;S2onP2, and O = E3;S3onP3. We proceed by case
analysis on why M unionmultiO α−−→M ′ unionmultiO′, for some action α.
• α = cv. Suppose M unionmulti O cv−−−→ M ′ unionmulti O′ is derived by an application of rule (Out). We have two
possible cases:
– either P1 ‖ P3 cv−−−→ P1 ‖ P ′3, because P3
cv−−−→ P ′3, for some P ′3, O′ = S3onP ′3, and M ′ =M ,
– or P1 ‖ P3 cv−−−→ P ′1 ‖ P3, because P1
cv−−−→ P ′1, for some P ′1, and M = S1onP ′1 and O′ = O.
In the first case, by an application of rule (Par) we derive P2 ‖ P3 cv−−−→ P2 ‖ P ′3. Since both
system invariants of N and O are satisfied, we can derive the required trace N unionmultiO cv−−−→ N unionmultiO′
by an application of rule (Out). In the second case, since P1
cv−−−→ P ′1 and the invariant of M is
satisfied, by an application of rule (Out) we can derive M
cv−−−→ M ′. As M v N , there exists a
trace N ĉv===⇒ N ′, for some system N ′. Thus, by several applications of rule (Par) we can easily
derive N unionmultiO ĉv===⇒ N ′ unionmultiO = N ′ unionmultiO′, as required.
• α = cv. Suppose M unionmulti O cv−−−→ M ′ unionmulti O′ is derived by an application of rule (Inp). This case is
similar to the previous one.
• α = τ . Suppose M unionmultiO τ−−→M ′ unionmultiO′ is derived by an application of rule (SensRead). We have two
possible cases:
– either P1 ‖ P3 s?v−−−→ P1 ‖ P ′3 because P3
s?v−−−→ P ′3, for some P ′3, P1 ‖ P3
Es!v−−−−→6 (and hence
P3
Es!v−−−−→6 ), M ′ =M and O′ = S3onP ′3,
– or P1 ‖ P3 s?v−−−→ P ′1 ‖ P3 because P1
s?v−−−→ P ′1, for some P ′1, P1 ‖ P3
Es!v−−−−→6 (and hence
P1
Es!v−−−−→6 ) and M ′ = S1onP ′1 and O′ = O.
In the first case, by an application of rule (Par) we derive P2 ‖ P3 s?v−−−→ P2 ‖ P ′3. Moreover from
P3
Es!v−−−−→6 and since the sets of sensors are always disjoint, we can derive P2 ‖ P3 Es!v−−−−→6 . Since
both invariants of N and O are satisfied, we can derive N unionmulti O τ−−→ N unionmulti O′ by an application
of rule (SensRead), as required. In the second case, since P1
s?v−−−→ P ′1 and the invariant of M is
satisfied, by an application of rule (SensRead) we can derive M
τ−−→ M ′ with M ′ = S1onP ′1. As
M v N , there exists a derivation N τˆ==⇒ N ′, for some N ′. Thus, we can derive the required trace
N unionmultiO τˆ==⇒ N ′ unionmultiO by an application of rule (Par).
• α = τ . Suppose that M unionmultiO τ−−→M ′ unionmultiO′ is derived by an application of rule (ESensSniff E). This
case is similar to the previous one.
• α = τ . Suppose that M unionmulti O τ−−→ M ′ unionmulti O′ is derived by an application of rule (ActWrite). This
case is similar to the case (SensRead).
• α = τ . Suppose that M unionmultiO τ−−→M ′ unionmultiO′ is derived by an application of rule (EAcIntegr E). This
case is similar to the case (ESensSniff E).
• α = τ . Suppose that M unionmultiO τ−−→M ′ unionmultiO′ is derived by an application of rule (Tau). We have four
possible cases:
– P1 ‖ P3 τ−−→ P ′1 ‖ P ′3 by an application of rule (Com). We have two sub-cases: either
P1
cv−−−→ P ′1 and P3
cv−−−→ P ′3, or P1
cv−−−→ P ′1 and P3
cv−−−→ P ′3, for some P ′1 and P ′3. We prove
the first case, the second one is similar. As the invariant of M is satisfied, by an application
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of rule (Out) we can derive M
cv−−−→M ′. As M v N , there exists a trace N τˆ==⇒ cv−−−→ τˆ==⇒ N ′,
for some N ′ = E2;S′2onP ′2. As P3
cv−−−→ P ′3, by several applications of rule (Par) and one of
rule (Com) we derive N unionmultiO ĉv===⇒ N ′ unionmultiO′, as required.
– P1 ‖ P3 τ−−→ P1 ‖ P ′3 or P1 ‖ P3
τ−−→ P ′1 ‖ P3 by an application of (Par). This case is easy.
– P1 ‖ P3 τ−−→ P ′1 ‖ P ′3 by an application of either rule (EActDrop E) or rule (ESensIntegr E). This
case does not apply as the sets of actuators of M and O are disjoint.
– P1 ‖ P3 τ−−→ P ′1 ‖ P ′3 by the application of on rule among (Res), (Rec), (Then) and (Else). This
case does not apply to parallel processes.
• α = deadlock. Suppose thatMunionmultiO deadlock−−−−−−−→M ′unionmultiO′ is derived by an application of rule (Deadlock).
This case is not admissible as the invariants of M , N and O are satisfied.
• α = tick. Suppose that M unionmulti O tick−−−→ M ′ unionmulti O′ is derived by an application of rule (Time). This
implies P1 ‖ P3 tick−−−→ P ′1 ‖ P ′3, for some P ′1 and P ′3, M ′ = E1;S′1onP ′1 and O = E3;S′3onP ′3, with
S′1 ∈ next(E1;S1) and S′3 ∈ next(E3;S3). As P1 ‖ P3
tick−−−→ P ′1 ‖ P ′3 can only be derived by an
application of rule (TimePar), it follows that P1
tick−−−→ P ′1 and P3
tick−−−→ P ′3. Since the invariant of
M is satisfied, by an application of rule (Time) we can derive M
tick−−−→M ′ with M ′ = E1;S′1onP ′1.
As M v N , there exists a derivation N τˆ==⇒ N ′′ tick−−−→ N ′′′ τˆ==⇒ N ′, for some N ′ = E2;S′2onP ′2,
N ′′ = E2;S′′2 onP ′′2 , N ′′′ = E2;S′′′2 onP ′′′2 , with S′′′2 ∈ next(E2;S′′2 ). By several applications of rule
(Par) we can derive that N unionmulti O τˆ==⇒ N ′′ unionmulti O and N ′′′ unionmulti O′ τˆ==⇒ N ′ unionmulti O′. In order to conclude
the proof, it is sufficient to prove N ′′ unionmultiO tick−−−→ N ′′′ unionmultiO′. By the definition of rule (Time), from
N ′′
tick−−−→ N ′′′ it follows that P ′′2
tick−−−→ P ′′′2 . As P3
tick−−−→ P ′3, by an application of rule (TimePar)
it follows that P ′′2 ‖ P3
tick−−−→ P ′′′2 ‖ P ′3. Since S′′′2 ∈ next(E2;S′′2 ) and S′3 ∈ next(E3;S3) we can
derive that S′′′2 unionmulti S′3 ∈ next(E2;S′′2 ) ∪ next(E3;S3). By an application of rule (Time) we have
N ′′ unionmultiO tick−−−→ N ′′′ unionmultiO′ and hence N unionmultiO t̂ick===⇒ N ′ unionmultiO′, as required.
• α = unsafe. Suppose thatM unionmultiO unsafe−−−−−→M ′unionmultiO′ is derived by an application of rule (Safety). This
is similar to the case α = cv by considering the fact that ξx 6∈ safe implies that ξx∪ξx′ 6∈ safe∪safe ′,
for any ξx′ and any safe ′.
Inductive case. We have to prove that M unionmulti O = M0 unionmulti O0 α1−−−→ · · · αn−−−→ Mn unionmulti On implies N unionmulti O =
N0 unionmultiO0 α̂1===⇒ · · · α̂n===⇒ Nn unionmultiOn. We can use the inductive hypothesis to easily deal with the first n− 1
actions and resort to the base case to handle the nth action.
2. We have to prove that M v N implies M ‖ P v N ‖ P , for any pure-logical process P . This is a
special case of (1) as M ‖ P = M unionmulti (∅; ∅onP ) and N ‖ P = N unionmulti (∅; ∅onP ), where ∅; ∅onP is a CPS
with no physical process in it, only logics.
3. We have to prove that M v N implies M\c v N\c, for any channel c. For any derivation
M\c t−−→M ′\c we can easily derive that M t−−→M ′ with c not occurring in t. Since M v N , it follows
that N tˆ==⇒ N ′, for some N ′. Since c does not appear in t, we can easily derive that N\c tˆ==⇒ N ′\c, as
required.
In order to prove Theorem 2 we adapt to CCPSA two standard lemmata used in process calculi theory to
compose and decompose the actions performed by a compound system.
Lemma 2 (Decomposing system actions). Let M and N be two CPSs in CCPSA. Then,
• if M unionmultiN tick−−−→M ′ unionmultiN ′, for some M ′ and N ′, then M tick−−−→M ′ and N tick−−−→ N ′;
• if M unionmultiN deadlock−−−−−−−→M unionmultiN , then M deadlock−−−−−−−→M or N deadlock−−−−−−−→ N ;
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• if M unionmulti N τ−−→ M ′ unionmulti N ′, for some M ′ and N ′, due to a channel synchronisation between M and N ,
then either M
cv−−−→M ′ and N cv−−−→ N ′, or M cv−−−→M ′ and N cv−−−→ N ′, for some channel c;
• if M unionmultiN α−−→M ′ unionmultiN ′, for some M ′ and N ′, α 6= tick, not due to a channel synchronisation between
M and N , then either M
α−−→M and N = N ′, or N α−−→ N and M =M ′.
Lemma 3 (Composing system actions). Let M and N be two CPSs of CCPSA. Then,
• If M tick−−−→M ′ and N tick−−−→ N ′, for some M ′ and N ′, then M unionmultiN tick−−−→M ′ unionmultiN ′;
• If N deadlock−−−−−−−→6 and M α−−→M ′, for some M ′ and α 6= tick, then M unionmultiN α−−→M ′ unionmultiN and N unionmultiM α−−→
N unionmultiM ′.
Proof of Theorem 2. Here, we prove case (1) of the theorem. The proofs of cases (2) and (3) are similar to
the corresponding ones of Theorem 1.
We prove that M vm..n N implies that there are m′, n′ ∈ N+ ∪ ∞, with m′..n′ ⊆ m..n such that
M unionmultiO vm′..n′ N unionmultiO. We prove separately that m′ ≥ m and n′ ≤ n.
• m′ ≥ m. We recall that m,m′ ∈ N+. If m = 1, then we trivially have m′ ≥ 1 = m. Otherwise, since m
is the minimum integer for which there is a trace t, with #tick(t) = m− 1, such that M t−−→ and N 6 tˆ==⇒,
then for any trace t, with #tick(t) < m− 1 and such that M t−−→, it holds that N tˆ==⇒. As done in the
proof of case (1) of Theorem 1, we can derive that for any trace t, with #tick(t) < m− 1 and such that
M unionmultiO t−−→ it holds that N unionmultiO tˆ==⇒. This implies the required condition, m′ ≥ m.
• n′ ≤ n. We recall that n is the infimum element of N+ ∪ {∞}, n ≥ m, such that whenever M t1−−→M ′,
with #tick(t1) = n− 1, there is t2, with #tick(t1) = #tick(t2), such that N t2−−→ N ′, for some N ′, and
M ′ v N ′. Now, if M unionmulti O t−−→ M ′ unionmulti O′, with #tick(t) = n − 1, by Lemma 2 we can split the trace t
by extracting the actions performed by M and those performed by O. Thus, there exist two traces
M
t1−−→ M ′ and O t3−−→ O′, with #tick(t1) = #tick(t3) = n − 1 whose combination has generated
the trace M unionmulti O t−−→ M ′ unionmulti O′. As M vm..n N , from M t1−−→ M ′ we know that there is a trace t2,
with #tick(t1) = #tick(t2), such that N
t2−−→ N ′, for some N ′, and M ′ v N ′. Since N t2−−→ N ′ and
O
t3−−→ O′, by an application of Lemma 3 we can build a trace N unionmultiO t
′
−−→ N ′ unionmultiO′, for some t′ such
that #tick(t) = #tick(t′) = n− 1. As M ′ v N ′, by Theorem 1 we can derive that M ′ unionmultiO′ v N ′ unionmultiO′.
This implies that n′ ≤ n.
In order to prove Theorem 3, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let M be an honest and sound CPS, C an arbitrary class of attacks, and A an attack of a class
C ′  C. Whenever M ‖ A t−−→M ′ ‖ A′, then M ‖ Top(C) tˆ==⇒M ′ ‖∏ι∈I Att(ι,#tick(t)+1, C(ι)).
Proof. Let us define Toph(C) as the attack process
∏
ι∈I Att(ι, h, C(ι)). Then, Top
1(C) = Top(C). The
proof is by mathematical induction on the length k of the trace t.
Base case. k = 1. This means t = α, for some action α. We proceed by case analysis on α.
• α = cv. As the attacker A does not use communication channels, from M ‖ A cv−−−→ M ′ ‖ A′ we
can derive that A = A′ and M
cv−−−→ M ′. Thus, by applications of rules (Par) and (Out) we derive
M ‖ Top(C) cv−−−→M ′ ‖ Top1(C) =M ′ ‖ Top(C).
• α = cv. This case is similar to the previous one.
• α = τ . There are five sub-cases.
37
– Let M ‖ A τ−−→ M ′ ‖ A′ be derived by an application of rule (SensRead). Since the attacker
A performs only malicious actions, from M ‖ A τ−−→ M ′ ‖ A′ we can derive that A = A′ and
P
s?v−−−→ P ′ for some process P and P ’ such that M = E;SonP and M ′ = E;SonP ′. By
considering rnd({true, false}) = false for any process Att(ι, 1, C(ι)), we have that Top(C) can only
perform a tick action, and Top(C)
Es!v−−−−→6 . Hence, by an application of rules (Par) and (SensRead)
we derive M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→M ′ ‖ Top1(C) =M ′ ‖ Top(C).
– Let M ‖ A τ−−→ M ′ ‖ A′ be derived by an application of rule (ActWrite). This case is similar to
the previous one.
– Let M ‖ A τ−−→ M ′ ‖ A′ be derived by an application of rule (ESensSniff E). Since M is sound
it follows that M = M ′ and A
Es?v−−−−→ A′. This entails 1 ∈ C ′(Es?) ⊆ C(Es?). By assum-
ing rnd({true, false}) = true for the process Att(Es?, 1, C(Es?)), it follows that Top(C) Es?v−−−−→
Top1(C) = Top(C). Hence, by applying the rules (Par) and (ESensRead E) we deriveM ‖ Top(C) τ−−→
M ′ ‖ Top1(C) =M ′ ‖ Top(C).
– Let M ‖ A τ−−→ M ′ ‖ A′ be derived by an application of rule (EActIntgr E). Since M is sound
it follows that M = M ′ and A
Ea!v−−−−→ A′. As a consequence, 1 ∈ C ′(Ea!) ⊆ C(Ea!). By
assuming rnd({true, false})=true and rnd(R) = v for the process Att(Ea!, 1, C(Ea!)), it follows that
Top(C)
Ea!v−−−−→ Top1(C) = Top(C). Thus, by applying the rules (Par) and (EActIntegr E) we derive
M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→M ′ ‖ Top1(C) =M ′ ‖ Top(C).
– Let M ‖ A τ−−→ M ′ ‖ A′ be derived by an application of rule (Tau). Let M = E;SonP and
M ′ = E′;SonP ′. First, we consider the case when P ‖ A τ−−→ P ′ ‖ A′ is derived by an application
of either rule (ESensIntegr E) or rule (EActDrop E). Since M is sound and A can perform only
malicious actions, we have that: (i) either P
s?v−−−→ P ′ and A Es!v−−−−→ A′ (ii) or P a!v−−−→ P ′ and
A
Ea?v−−−−→ A′. We focus on the first case as the second one is similar.
Since A
Es!v−−−−→ A′, we derive 1 ∈ C ′(Es!) ⊆ C(Es!), and Top(C) Es!v−−−−→ Top1(C) = Top(C), by
assuming rnd({true, false}) = true and rnd(R) = v for the process Att(Es!, 1, C(Es!)). Thus, by
applying the rules (ESensIntegr E) and (Tau) we derive M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→ M ′ ‖ Top1(C) = M ′ ‖
Top(C), as required.
To conclude the proof we observe that if P ‖ A τ−−→ P ′ ‖ A′ is derived by an application
of a rule different from (ESensIntegr E) and (EActDrop E), then by inspection of Table 1 and by
definition of attacker, it follows that A can’t perform a τ -action since A does not use channel
communication and performs only malicious actions. Thus, the only possibility is that the τ -action
is performed by P in isolation. As a consequence, by applying the rules (Par) and (Tau), we derive
M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→M ′ ‖ Top1(C) =M ′ ‖ Top(C).
• α = tick. In this case the transition M ‖ A tick−−−→M ′ ‖ A′ is derived by an application of rule (Time)
because M
tick−−−→ M ′ and A tick−−−→ A′. Hence, it suffices to prove that Top(C) tick−−−→ Top2(C). We
consider two cases: 1 ∈ C(ι) and 1 6∈ C(ι). If 1 ∈ C(ι), then the transition Att(ι, 1, C(ι)) tick−−−→
Att(ι, 2, C(ι)) can be derived by assuming rnd({true, false}) = false. Moreover, since rnd({true, false}) =
false the process Att(ι, 1, C(ι)) can only perform a tick action. If 1 6∈ C(ι), then the process Att(ι, 1, C(ι))
can only perform a tick action. As a consequence, Att(ι, 1, C(ι))
tick−−−→ Att(ι, 2, C(ι)) and Top(C) tick−−−→
Top2(C). By an application of rule (Time), we derive M ‖ Top(C) tick−−−→M ′ ‖ Top2(C).
• α = deadlock. This case is not admissible because M ‖ A deadlock−−−−−−−→M ′ ‖ A′ would entail M deadlock−−−−−−−→
M ′. However, M is sound and it can’t deadlock.
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• α = unsafe. Again, this case is not admissible because M is sound.
Inductive case (k > 1). We have to prove that M ‖ A t−−→ M ′ ‖ A′ implies M ‖ Top(C) tˆ==⇒ M ′ ‖
Top#tick(t)+1(C). Since the length of t is greater than 1, it follows that t = t′α, for some trace t′ and some
action α. Thus, there exist M ′′ and A′′ such that M ‖ A t
′
−−→ M ′′ ‖ A′′ α−−→ M ′ ‖ A′. By inductive
hypothesis, it follows that M ‖ Top(C) tˆ′==⇒M ′′ ‖ Top#tick(t′)+1(C). To conclude the proof, it is enough to
show that M ′′ ‖ A′′ α−−→M ′ ‖ A′ implies M ′′ ‖ Top#tick(t′)+1(C) αˆ==⇒M ′ ‖ Top#tick(t)+1(C). The reasoning
is similar to that followed in the base case, except for actions α = deadlock and α = unsafe that need to be
treated separately. We prove the case α = deadlock as the case α = unsafe is similar.
Let M = E;SonP . The transition M ′′ ‖ A deadlock−−−−−−−→M ′ ‖ A′ must be derived by an application of rule
(Deadlock). This implies that M ′′ =M ′, A′′ = A′ and the state function of M is not in the invariant set inv .
Thus, by an application of rule (Deadlock) we derive
M ′′ ‖ Top#tick(t′)+1(C) deadlock−−−−−−−→M ′ ‖ Top#tick(t′)+1(C).
Since #tick(t) + 1 = #tick(t′) + #tick(deadlock) + 1 = #tick(t′) + 1, it follows, as required, that
M ′′ ‖ Top#tick(t′)+1(C) deadlock−−−−−−−→M ′ ‖ Top#tick(t)+1(C) .
Everything is finally in place to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. We have to prove that either M ‖ A v M or M ‖ A vm2..n2 M , for some m2 and n2
such that m2..n2 ⊆ m1..n1 (m2 = 1 and n2 = ∞ if the two systems are completely unrelated). The proof
proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that M ‖ A 6v M and M ‖ A vm2..n2 M , with m2..n2 6⊆ m1..n1. We
distinguish two cases: either n1 =∞ or n1 ∈ N+.
If n1 =∞, then it must be m2 < m1. Since M ‖ A vm2..n2 M , by Definition 10 there is a trace t, with
#tick(t) = m2−1, such that M ‖ A t−−→ and M 6 tˆ==⇒. By Lemma 4, this entails M ‖ Top(C) tˆ==⇒. Since
M 6 tˆ==⇒ and #tick(t) = m2−1 < m2 < m1, this contradicts M ‖ Top(C) vm1..n1 M .
If n1 ∈ N+, then m2 < m1 and/or n1 < n2, and we reason as in the previous case.
Proof of Theorem 4. We consider the two parts of the statement separately.
Definitive impact. By an application of Lemma 4 we have that M ‖ A t−−→ entails M ‖ Top(C) tˆ==⇒.
This implies M ‖ A v M ‖ Top(C). Thus, if M ‖ Top(C) v M [ξw ← ξw+ξ], for ξ ∈ RXˆ , ξ > 0, then, by
transitivity of v, it follows that M ‖ A vM [ξw ← ξw+ξ].
Pointwise impact. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose ξ′ > ξ. Since Top(C) has a pointwise
impact ξ at time m, it follows that ξ is given by:
inf
{
ξ′′ : ξ′′∈RXˆ ∧ M ‖ Top(C) vm..n M [ξw ← ξw+ξ′′], n ∈ N+ ∪∞
}
.
Similarly, since A has a pointwise impact ξ′ at time m′, it follows that ξ′ is given by
inf
{
ξ′′ : ξ′′∈RXˆ ∧ M ‖ A vm′..n M [ξw ← ξw+ξ′′], n ∈ N+ ∪∞
}
.
Now, if m = m′, then ξ ≥ ξ′ because M ‖ A t−−→ entails M ‖ Top(C) tˆ==⇒ due to an application
of Lemma 4. This is contradiction with the fact that ξ < ξ′. Thus, it must be m′ < m. Now, since
both ξ and ξ′ are the infimum functions and since ξ′ > ξ, there are ξ and ξ′, with ξ≤ξ≤ξ′≤ξ′ such that:
(i) M ‖ Top(C) vm..n M [ξw ← ξw+ξ], for some n; (ii) M ‖ A vm′..n′ M [ξw ← ξw+ξ′], for some n′.
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From M ‖ A vm′..n′ M [ξw ← ξw+ξ′] it follows that there exists a trace t with #tick(t) = m′ − 1 such
that M ‖ A t−−→ and M [ξw ← ξw+ξ′] 6 tˆ==⇒. Since ξ ≤ ξ′, by monotonicity (Proposition 6), we deduce that
M [ξw ← ξw+ξ] 6 tˆ==⇒. Moreover, by Lemma 4 M ‖ A t−−→ entails M ‖ Top(C) tˆ==⇒.
Summarising, there exists a trace t′ with #tick(t′) = m′ − 1 such that M ‖ Top(C) t
′
−−→ and M [ξw ←
ξw+ξ] 6 tˆ
′
==⇒. However, this, together with m′ < m, is in contradiction with the fact (i) above saying that
M ‖ Top(C) vm..n M [ξw ← ξw+ξ], for some n. As a consequence it must be ξ′ ≤ ξ and m′ ≤ m. This
concludes the proof.
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